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Abstract
Across the United States and Europe, notice and consent, the
act of clicking that “I have read and agree” to a platform’s terms
of service, is the central device for legitimating and enabling
platforms’ data processing, acting as a free pass for a variety of
intrusive activities which include profiling and behavioral
advertising. Notwithstanding literature and findings that lay
significant doubts on notice and consent’s adequacy as a
regulatory device in the platform ecosystem, courts, regulators
and other public authorities across these regions keep adopting
and legitimating these practices. Yet while consent seems a good
proxy for ensuring justice in the platform economy, it is an empty
construct. This Article explains how notice and consent practices
in the platform economy are not only normatively futile but also
positively harmful. Narrow understandings that focus on
voluntariness and disclosure such as the ones generally adopted
by regulators and courts fail to account for the systemically
unjust background conditions within which voluntary
individual acts of consent take place. Through such narrow
approaches, regulators are failing to acknowledge that consent
cannot be reasonably taken to morally transform the rights,
obligations and relationships that it purports to reshape.
Further, it positively harms consumers in at least three ways:
burdening them with decisions they cannot meaningfully make;
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subordinating their core inalienable rights to respect and dignity
to the economic interests of platforms and creating widespread
ideological resistance against alternatives. Notice and consent
as a discourse is hardly contestable and is currently part of the
rigid background of assumed facts about our digital
environment. As new legislation is devised in the US and new
opportunities to reinterpret the GDPR present themselves in the
EU, we must be more courageous in looking beyond the façade of
individual control and instead grapple with the core structure of
corporate surveillance markets.
The longer we fail to
acknowledge consent’s irrelevance to data governance, the longer
we will deny ourselves respect and protection from the evergrowing expansion of digital markets into our lives.
Introduction
When attempting to create an account on Facebook.com,
individuals are prompted to read a set of Terms of Service,1
which they can choose to scroll through and ignore, and are
simultaneously asked to tick a box, usually situated at the
bottom of the screen, to indicate their agreement to such terms.
These contractual terms, alongside multiple annexed clauses
and webpages,2 form the basis of a user’s contractual agreement
with Facebook, an agreement which, amongst other things,
broadly regulates the types of data that Facebook can collect
from its users and the possible uses it can make of such data.
Facebook collects data provided by individuals at the moment of
* S.J.D. Candidate at Harvard Law School. I thank Professors Yochai
Benkler, Richard Fallon, Urs Gasser, Meira Levinson, Mathias Risse, Thomas
Scanlon, and Lucas Stanczyk for their valuable input on this piece. I also thank
the Edmond J. Safra Center’s Graduate Fellows of 2018-19 and the Berkman
Klein Center’s fellows, affiliates and staff for conversations and inspiration on
this topic.
1. Terms
of
Service,
FACEBOOK,
https://www.facebook.com/legal/terms/update?ref=old_policy (last visited Nov.
24, 2019).
2. See Data Policy, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/about/privacy/
(last visited Nov. 24, 2019); About Facebook Ads, FACEBOOK,
https://www.facebook.com/ads/about (last visited Nov. 24, 2019); Your Ad
Preferences,
FACEBOOK,
https://www.facebook.com/ads/preferences/?entry_product=education_page
(last visited Nov. 24, 2019).
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opting-in and throughout their relationship with the company,
for a variety of uses and purposes including but not limited to
the targeting of advertising, content moderation, and the
improvement of platform functionality.3 Facebook has also
recently been found to combine data from its users’ Facebook
profiles with other data collected on them through other
Facebook and non-Facebook services such as Instagram and
others.4
The increasing risks attached to intrusive data harvesting
practices, including the targeting of content and ads based on a
person’s personal features, prompt us to ask anew why the law,
along with other factors, enables and incentivizes data-driven
activities by placing unjustified regulative power in notice and
consent mechanisms? The law could directly shape and
constrain dataflows and hold companies accountable by
determining the kinds of information that should and should not
be generated, collected, and used. Instead, around the globe the
emphasis on what Daniel Solove has called “privacy selfmanagement,”5 reliance of contractual privacy policies, shifts the
regulatory burden on users, leaving the industry free to engage
in harvesting activities as they wish. Within the existing
ecosystem, notice and consent’s main function seems to be to
performatively legitimate otherwise unregulated unacceptable
corporate practices, and to facilitate permissionless innovation.
It is striking to note how recurrent the emphasis on
individual consent and disclosure requirements is in privacy
legislation and company practices around the world. In the
United States, privacy self-management is the primary check on
companies’ ability to engage in data-driven activities as they
wish, albeit being a voluntary and self-regulated practice.6 The
3. See Data Policy, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/about/privacy/
(last visited Nov. 24, 2019).
4. Case Summary: Facebook, Exploitative Business Terms Pursuant to
Section 19(1) GWB for Inadequate Data Processing, BUNDERSKARTELLAMT (Feb.
15, 2019), https://perma.cc/95X5-83DW; Bundeskartellamt Prohibits Facebook
from Combining User Data from Different Sources, BUNDESKARTELLAMT (Feb.
7, 2019), https://perma.cc/3PFM-7MVP; Background Information of the
Facebook
Proceeding,
BUNDESKARTELLAMT
(Feb.
7,
2019),
https://perma.cc/RB4P-S9Y8.
5. See Symposium, Privacy Self-Management and the Consent Dilemma,
126 HARV. L. REV. 1880, 1880 (2013).
6. See Daniel J. Solove & Woodrow Hartzog, The FTC and the New
Common Law of Privacy, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 583 (2014). Note that the FTC
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European Union has a more substantive approach to consent
based on informational self-determination.7 Under the recent
EU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR),8 the burden of
proving valid consent is greater, as consent must be informed,
specific, unambiguous, freely given,9 and consent is not the only
basis for lawful processing.10 Yet even the European approach
places too much emphasis on informed consent, thus failing to
protect users in the platform economy.
While much past and recent academic work has emphasized
the limits of notice and consent,11 few are those who present a
has a role in bringing civil actions against entities that engage in unfair or
deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce under 15 U.S.C.S. § 45
(LEXIS through Pub. L. 116-72).
7. See, e.g., Symposium, Privacy and Technology: The EU-U.S. Privacy
Collision: A Turn to Institutions and Procedures, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1966
(2013); Woodrow Hartzog & Neil M. Richards, Privacy’s Constitutional Moment
and the Limits of Data Protection (May 2019) (draft presented at the Privacy
Law Scholars Conf.); Anupam Chander, Margot E. Kaminski & William
McGeveran, Catalyzing Privacy (May 2019) (draft presented at the Privacy
Law Scholars Conf.).
8. Gen. Data Protection Reg. 2016/679 of Apr. 27, 2016.
9. Id. at arts. 4, 6, and 7. (E.g. Article 7 of the GDPR on “conditions for
consent” reads as follows: “(1) Where processing is based on consent, the
controller shall be able to demonstrate that the data subject has consented to
processing of his or her personal data. (2) If the data subject’s consent is given
in the context of a written declaration which also concerns other matters, the
request for consent shall be presented in a manner which is clearly
distinguishable from the other matters, in an intelligible and easily accessible
form, using clear and plain language. Any part of such a declaration which
constitutes an infringement of this Regulation shall not be binding. (3) The data
subject shall have the right to withdraw his or her consent at any time. The
withdrawal of consent shall not affect the lawfulness of processing based on
consent before its withdrawal. Prior to giving consent, the data subject shall be
informed thereof. It shall be as easy to withdraw as to give consent. (4) When
assessing whether consent is freely given, utmost account shall be taken of
whether, inter alia, the performance of a contract, including the provision of a
service, is conditional on consent to the processing of personal data that is not
necessary for the performance of that contract.”).
10. There are six bases for lawful processing of data under the General
Data Protection Regulation 2016/679 of Apr. 27, 2016. One of these bases is
that ‘the data subject has given consent to the processing of his or her personal
data for one or more specific purposes’ under Article VI(1)(a).
11. See, e.g., Solon Barocas & Helen Nissenbaum, Computing Ethics: Big
Data’s End Run Around Procedural Privacy Protections, 57 COMMC’N OF THE
ACM 31, 33 (Nov. 2014), https://perma.cc/X8FF-8C27; Solon Barocas & Helen
Nissenbaum, On Notice: The Trouble with Notice and Consent, PROCEEDINGS
OF THE ENGAGING DATA FORUM: THE FIRST INT’L FORUM ON THE APP. AND MGMT.
OF PERS. ELEC. INFO. (2009); Fred H. Cate & Viktor Mayer-Schonberger, Notice
and Consent in a World of Big Data, 3 INT’L DATA PRIVACY LAW 67 (2013); Julie
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nuanced account of consent that attempts to guide concrete
policy.12 Much of the existing work on digital consent falls into
one of two clusters. It either usefully articulates consent’s
normative force but then mirrors the industry’s consent-friendly
stance, or otherwise it engages in abstract or indiscriminate
rejections of the practice without sufficient articulation of how
consent operates and what is at stake. Yet, as Elizabeth
Edenberg and Meg Leta-Jones have shown, the legitimacy of
consent is not a binary question and must be evaluated
contextually.13 Consent has an important normative function:
the potential to transform an act of trespass into a legitimate
invitation, or an act of battery into legitimate contact. We must
scrutinize both the normative role and the discursive force of
digital consent to explain when and why regulators must depart
from the centrality of this practice in certain contexts.
When it comes to the digital economy, as early as 2014
Helen Nissenbaum and Solon Barocas argued that “[c]onsent . . .
should not bear, and should never have borne, the entire burden
of protecting privacy.”14 This Article goes a step further. It
argues that the ideal of autonomous consent cannot be reached
in practice in the platform economy because the conditions
which constitute consent as a morally transformative device are
absent. These conditions are three-fold: (1) that which is being
transformed through consent must be capable of being
transformed; (2) that acts of consent must not significantly harm
third parties; and (3) that objectionable power imbalances must
not be shaping the environment within which a decision to
consent is made. In other words, consent is structurally
incapable of empowering individuals in the platform economy.
What remains is an empty construct. This is not an argument
about the validity of individual instances of digital consent, but
rather about the justifiability of relying on notice and consent as
E. Cohen, Turning Privacy Inside Out, 20 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES IN L. (2019);
Julie E. Cohen, Law for the Platform Economy, 51 U.C.D. L. REV. 133 (2017);
Privacy Self-Management and the Consent Dilemma, supra note 5; SHOSHANA
ZUBOFF, infra note 213.
12. See, e.g., Daniel Susser, Notice After Notice-and-Consent: Why Privacy
Disclosures Are Valuable Even If Consent Frameworks Aren’t, 9 J. INFO. POL.
(2019).
13. Elizabeth Edenberg & Meg Leta-Jones, Analyzing the Legal Roots and
Moral Core of Digital Consent, NEW MEDIA & SOC’Y 1 (2019)
14. Barocas & Nissenbaum, supra note 11, at 33.
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a default practice.
The discourse15 of autonomous consent and the assumptions
that underlie it positively harm consumers in two ways: by
imputing responsibility on users for outcomes that no one could
have reasonably chosen; and by focusing attention on the wrong
kinds of values and creating collective resistance around
alternatives that should be promoted. It seems that notice and
consent in fact act as technologies of power:16 a default practice
that has become hard to contest and is part of the background of
assumed facts about our digital environment. When faced with
the effects of such a default practice, entrepreneurs and
regulators too often recite arguments about the absolute
primacy of individual autonomy. Individuals need greater
control over their digital lives, they say, and consent is the best,
if not the only, option we have. These responses are symptomatic
of a dismaying lack of imagination around existing and future
alternatives.
This Article proceeds in five parts. Part I of this Article
articulates the subjective and objective dimensions of consent,
its morally transformative function, and shows that for consent
to operate as a morally transformative device it must be given
under just background conditions. This requires three things:
(1) that what is being transformed through consent must be
capable of being transformed; (2) that acts of consent must not
significantly harm third parties; and (3) that there must be no
objectionable power imbalances.
Part II of this Article looks at how notice and consent are
interpreted and relied on in the United States and Europe,
showing that even the most stringent of approaches to data
privacy seem to rely on interpretations of consent’s role that fail
to protect consumers.
Part III of this Article explores what individuals have
reason to demand (in the platform economy), their digital
“interests,” and compares those interests to what the reality of
15. On the notion of discourse, see MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE HISTORY OF
SEXUALITY, VOL. 1: AN INTRODUCTION (Robert Hurley trans., Random House
1978) (1978); MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE ARCHAEOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE AND THE
DISCOURSE ON LANGUAGE (A.M. Sheridan Smith trans., Tavistock Publications
Limited 1971) (1969).
16. The term is borrowed from Foucault. See Michel Foucault, About the
Beginning of the Hermeneutics of the Self: Two Lectures at Dartmouth, 21 POL.
THEORY 198 (1993).
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notice and consent enables them to demand from platforms. It
shows that reliance on notice and consent structurally
presupposes that we subject our fundamental interests to
platforms’ own selfish interests.
Part IV of this Article develops these insights by showing
that privacy and protection from digital harms, such as
manipulation and discrimination, have aspects that cannot be
disposed of through consent: they have an inalienable core and
interpersonal aspects that must be managed collectively.
Further, it shows that subjecting any residual alienable aspects
to the operation of notice and consent can lead to systemic harm
in the platform economy.
Part V of this Article concludes by re-evaluating notice and
consent’s normative salience, asking whether paternalism can
be an argument for resisting alternatives and develops an
understanding of platform power that helps explain the existing
gap between what we have reason to want in the platform
economy, and what relying on notice and consent prevents us
from obtaining under the mirage of autonomy, transformative
power and coveted free services.
I. What Consent Is For
Consent is a contested concept that serves important social,
political and normative functions in our society. In moral
philosophy, an act of consent between two people is a reason to
normatively reassess their relationship.
Consent has a
transformative normative function, it changes the justifications
individuals have toward one another, the moral rights and
obligations that exist between them. By consenting to someone
entering into my house, I allow them to be inside it,
transforming a trespass into a legitimate visit. By consenting to
a doctor’s auscultation, I transform a battery into an act of
legitimate contact. Consent is key to the moral transformation
of these and many other human relationships, and it would be
difficult to imagine a world in which consent had absolutely no
legitimating function or value. Yet when it comes to the digital
economy, such value becomes at least questionable.
To evaluate whether digital consent has the moral force it is
said to possess, we should look not only at whether the consenter
acted autonomously of his own will, but also at the background
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conditions that constitute consent as a morally transformative
device. This section articulates these two key aspects of moral
consent, emphasizing that background conditions and
underlying power dynamics constitute the moral transformative
force of consent.
A. Elements of Consent
1. Three Scenarios
The following three fictional scenarios might guide our
intuitions about the core case of moral consent.
Imagine a society, not so different from many existing ones,
call it society A, where being born a girl means you will undergo
a female genital mutilation procedure. Is being born a girl a
form of consent to these procedures? No one in society A asks
the baby whether it wants to undergo the procedure. Being born
a woman does seem to legitimate a variety of degrading or
discriminatory treatments, yet saying that these treatments
have been normatively legitimated through consent seems
absurd. An inborn characteristic such as sex at birth can hardly
be a form of consent.
Imagine now a second society, society B, where a person
must give a stone to another person to indicate that they accept
physical contact. In society B, women cannot legitimately be
touched unless they transfer a stone to the persons they accept
to be touched by. It seems that the passing of a stone serves as
a form of consent: it is a self-directed act and is capable of
changing the rights and obligations between stone givers and
stone receivers.
Imagine finally a society C where if a woman wears a red
dress, people can approach and talk to her, and if she does not
wear a red dress, then they cannot. In such a society whether or
not a woman can be spoken to is partly determined by herself
and her decision to wear red, and partly subject to arbitrary
cultural constraints about when wearing red is appropriate.
Depending on context, women might intentionally choose to
wear red or be forced to wear red. One might envisage different
varieties of society C: somewhere red dresses are very rare,
others where women must wear red on most social occasions.
Where wearing a red dress is fully voluntary, an argument

9

2019

CONSENT AS A FREE PASS

319

might be made – likely controversially - that it is a form of
consent.
These fictional examples provide us with three insights.
First, they help us see a spectrum that ranges from intentional
acts of the consenter self-directedly imposing normative
consequences on themselves, to social norms or practices that
persons are subjected to or forced to follow by virtue of their
existence in a society (birth, social pressure, other external
factors). Second, the examples point to an intuition, that the
more an act is intentional and self-directed, the more it can be
said to fall within the moral core of consent. Third, it seems that
consent is a performative act whose normative meaning is highly
dependent on the social, political and cultural conditions that
enable it: things that amount to consent in one society or group
may not amount to consent in other contexts.
The question, then, is what distinguishes a core case of
morally transformative consent from things that are not
understood as consent and what characteristics indicate
whether a given cultural ritual, action or attitude amounts to
consent. In other words: is there a test that allows us to
recognize morally significant consent?17
2. Accounts of Consent
This subsection outlines possible accounts of consent with
the aim of exploring the nature and contours of morally
significant consent rather than defending any specific account.
Consent between persons is said to have a “transformative role
in interpersonal interactions.”18 It transforms the rights and
obligations that exist between persons, rendering impermissible
things permissible and changing the expectations between
consenter and consentee. Two core cases of consent between
individuals can be identified:19

17. Note: the work of H.L.A. Hart on the normative “core” and “periphery”
of a rule of law and the rule of “recognition” for law is impliedly in this passage.
See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW (2d ed. 1961).
18. Edenberg & Leta-Jones, supra note 12. See also John Kleinig, The
Nature of Consent, in THE ETHICS OF CONSENT: THEORY AND PRACTICE
(Franklin Miller & Alan Werthmeier, eds., 2009).
19. Kleinig, supra note 18, at 4.
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[C]onsent can sometimes function like a
proprietary gate that one opens to allow another’s
access, access that would be impermissible absent
the act of voluntarily opening the gate. [. . .] Or,
sometimes, consent can function like a normative
rope whereby one binds oneself to another.20
In spite of significant overlap between these two cases,
digital consent mainly falls within the former case: it operates
as a gate that allows access to personal data. Consenting to an
online privacy policy effectively authorizes a tech company to
perform actions vis-à-vis users that prior to their consent would
not have been justifiable. Having obtained user consent, the
company can now engage freely in otherwise illegitimate data
collection and uses such as profiling or microtargeting.
But what exactly is consent and how to explain its
transformative moral power? Joseph Raz offers a helpful
analytical understanding of how consent works:
Consent is given by any behaviour (act or
omission) undertaken in the belief that (1) it will
change the normative situation of another; (2) it
will do so because it is undertaken with such a
belief; (3) it will be understood by its observers to
be of this character.21
Raz understands consent as being mainly about how the
consenter perceives their act. Yet we can see it as having two
components. First, it has a subjective dimension: the consenter’s
intention or mental acceptance that their act of consent (or
omission) will change the rights and obligations of another, and
that the act will be perceived by others as consent. Unless there
is a self-directed act of the will on the consenter’s part, there can
be no consent. Second, consent has an objective dimension: it
must be perceived by external observers as changing the rights
and obligations between consentee and consenter.
Both
subjective and objective elements are reflexive: the subjective
act of the will cannot acquire moral salience without belief in
20. Id.
21. JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 81 (1986).
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external recognition, and external recognition must go to the
subjective element too. Accounts of consent are divided on the
question of which of these two elements should have more
salience. While some believe consent is mostly about the mental
state of the consenter, and exists insofar as a subjective act of
the will was present, others believe the notion of consent is
contextual and must be understood as a communicative act:
unless external observers perceive the act as being one of
consent there can be no consent at all.22
Moreover, according to some philosophers the core function
of consent is in its authorizing function.23 Consent allows us to
authorize others to perform certain actions vis-à-vis us. This
particular function of consent as an authorization mechanism is
particularly problematic in the digital economy. Consent
operates as an authorizing mechanism for corporate actions,
shielding the actors from otherwise legitimate complaints.
While consent can operate as an enabling device for companies,
the flipside is that it deprives users of some of their complaints
against platforms.
B. Conditions and Transformation
1. Conditions for Consent
At its best, an exercise of moral consent allows the consenter
to shape and change the course of their life and is an expression
of individual autonomy.24 At its worst, consent is a mere
fictional performance with no effects on existing power
structures and individual expectations.
There is a vast
literature on the conditions of moral consent, the various “tests”
we might need in order to distinguish autonomous acts of
consent from things that are not properly acts of consent.
Richard Fallon provides a helpful taxonomy on what he calls
the “conditions of [descriptive] autonomy.”25 If indeed we
22. Kleinig, supra note 18, at 4.
23. See, e.g., A. JOHN SIMMONS, MORAL PRINCIPLES AND POLITICAL
OBLIGATIONS 76 (1979).
24. Tom L. Beauchamp, Autonomy and Consent, in THE ETHICS OF
CONSENT: THEORY AND PRACTICE 55 (2009).
25. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Two Senses of Autonomy, 46 STANFORD L. REV.
875, 886 (1994).
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understand the best cases of consent as constituted by a selfdirected act, consent must at least fulfill the following conditions
for autonomous choice: (i) a critical and self-critical ability, (ii)
competence or capacity to act and choose, (iii) a sufficient
number of alternatives to choose from, and (iv) absence of
coercion or objectionable manipulation.26 Raz also specifies that
there must be an adequate range of morally acceptable options
meaning that the options must be varied in kind: it is more
autonomous to choose among a few good options than among
many very bad ones.27 For him, choosing among bad options may
not be autonomous at all.
Elizabeth Edenberg and Meg Leta Jones provide a list of
core conditions that are specific to digital settings.28 The first
condition they isolate is that (i) there must be a common and
clear understanding of the “background conditions for justifiable
and unjustifiable terms for collecting, using, and sharing
personal data,” which for them means broad societal agreement
on baseline and ceiling levels of permissible data use.29 The
other four conditions they identify all operate within the
parameters set by the first: (ii) a clearly defined scope for digital
consent; (iii) sufficient information and a sufficient
understanding of such information on the part of the consenter;
(iv) a viable set of options that the consenter can voluntarily
choose from; and (v) fair treatment of each of the parties to the
consensual relationship.30
Taking stock of various existing formulations of the
conditions of moral consent, including some that are included in
current laws, one could tentatively define moral consent as
possessing the following overlapping characteristics:
a) The person consenting must have the rational capacity
to meaningfully consent, i.e. they must not be too young,
mentally or physically impaired. They must have what

26. Id. See also GERALD DWORKIN, THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF
AUTONOMY (1988) (distinguishing between two aspects of autonomy
understood as self-rule: independence of one’s deliberation and choice from
manipulation by others and capacity to rule oneself).
27. RAZ, supra note 21, at 372.
28. Edenberg & Leta-Jones, supra note 12.
29. Edenberg &Leta-Jones, supra note 12, at 1811.
30. Id.
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Fallon calls critical and self-critical ability,31 i.e. a
capacity to rationally foresee the effects of one’s actions,
evaluate them and assess alternatives.
The act of consenting must not be subject to coercion or
objectionable manipulation of the will.
The act of consenting must be voluntary in the sense
that there must be at least one viable and morally
acceptable alternative in the form of a viable option to
walk away. An ambitious version of this condition would
include both an ability to withdraw consent and the
power to shape the content of the agreement
transforming it into a better alternative agreement.
The scope of the consent must be limited fairly.
Consent must be fully informed, it must be preceded by
a reasonable disclosure of the context, as well as the
possible and probable effects of consenting.
Consent must be present consent: a person should be free
to confirm or withdraw their consent at any moment in
their relationship with the other party. If the conditions
change, these must be disclosed. If consent is only
expressed once at the start of a relationship, changes in
circumstances may weaken its moral force and arguably
also its legal validity.
Consent must be given under otherwise just background
conditions: which includes the pre-condition of a full and
transparent disclosure of options available and their
content and implications, the fact that having the choice
must not consistently and unfairly lead to
discriminatory or unjust results for certain classes of
people, possibly a basic structure complying with
Rawlsian justice requirement.32

2. Identifying Morally Transformative Consent
In analyzing these lists of criteria, the goal has been to
distinguish acts or omissions that an external observer would
see as consent from acts or omissions that would not be
understood as consent. However, an ambiguity underlies these
31. Fallon, supra note 25, at 886.
32. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (Otfried Hoffe eds., 2d ed. 1999).
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lists of conditions. Some of these criteria help us distinguish acts
of consent from things that are not consent, while other criteria
help us determine whether an existing act of consent has a
morally transformative role. Bill might have consented to John
eating his snack in school, but if he did so because he has been
repeatedly bullied in the past then we can see how his consent,
no matter how autonomous and freely given, can hardly be
understood to justify John’s act transforming it into a legitimate
food sharing arrangement. Consent cannot change the injustice
of John’s act given the history of John’s relationship with Bill.
As Franklin Miller and Alan Wertheimer have emphasized, the
key question is not really whether consent exists or is valid, but
whether an act of consent can be taken to justify a legitimate
transformation of rights, obligations and expectations.33
The key question for us, therefore, is which conditions
constitute consent as a morally transformative act? Subjective
conditions of autonomous self-directed consent tell us whether
an act can properly be classified as consent in accordance with
Raz’ definition, but offers poor guidance when it comes to
determining whether consent legitimizes given consequences.
The fact that an act is self-directed and performed in the belief
that such act is an act of consent and will be perceived as such
is insufficient to legitimizing transformative consequences.
Legitimacy is contextual and depends on background conditions
(Edenberg and Leta Jones’ first condition, or our condition (g)),
which include questions of power and influence exercised over
users even when they don’t know it.
An important question in the platform economy is whether
ensuring just background conditions is possible.
C. Three Aspects of Morally Transformative Consent
What are just background conditions in the platform
economy, and when can ideal consent perform its transformative
role? Morally transformative consent cannot be identified by
drawing up a list of representative background conditions of
justice, or a “test” for recognizing morally transformative

33. Franklin G. Miller & Alan Wertheimer, Preface to a Theory of Consent
Transactions: Beyond Valid Consent, in THE ETHICS OF CONSENT: THEORY AND
PRACTICE (Miller & Wertheimer ed., 2010).
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consent. It is a question that must be assessed by looking at how
power materializes in any given context in which consent is
relied on. Three characteristics of consent are nonetheless worth
isolating to make sense of consent’s transformative role.
1. Consent and Alienability
Taking consent to be transformative of states of affairs,
rights, and obligations between persons presupposes that these
states, rights, and obligations are of a kind which can be
transformed through consent. Letting someone enter into one’s
house transforms a trespass into a license to stay in the house
and also changes the position of the consentee from trespasser
into guest. The right to prevent strangers from entering into
one’s house appears to be modified when one invites a stranger
inside, so that one now has less reason to object to their being
inside. Similarly, it seems that our right to prevent others from
using certain information about us, such as our date of birth, is
of a kind which can be amended by consent. After providing our
date of birth to another, we have less reason to object to their
use of that information. However, there are certain kinds of
rights or entitlements of persons which cannot be transformed
through consent. In a famous French case, it was found that
dwarfs could not consent to being thrown by a nightclub’s clients
in exchange for money because the personal dignity and respect
owed to persons with physical disability could not be given away
for money.34
Similarly, it could be argued that certain
particularly intrusive data practices, such as behavioral
targeting for political purposes, should not be capable of being
consented to, that our right to be immune from undue political
influences is inalienable.
2. Consent and the Collectivity
Moral consent operates between a consentee and a
consenter, generally to amend the consenter’s relationship with
the consentee. Consent may affect third parties who are
unaware or have no means of influencing the act of consent. If
34. Conseil d’Etat [CE] [French Administrative Court] Ass., Oct. 17, 1995,
136727, Rec. Lebon. CE Ass., Oct. 27, 1995, 136727, Rec. Lebon 372.
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an act of consent has far-reaching consequences for third parties,
it is argued that letting the consenter and consentee regulate
such consequences can be inappropriate. In other words, the
core case for morally transformative consent is a case where the
only persons affected by an act of consent are the consenter and
the consentee(s). As we shall see, digital notice and consent is
the opposite kind of case, one where the consent of one person
has the potential to affect larger groups of people.
3. Power
Third, considering the moral significance of consent
amounts to investigating the kinds of power dynamics that
underlie an act of consent and determining when the act, even if
autonomous, no longer gives rise to justifiable consequences. In
some cases indeed an act could be self-directed yet be affected by
factors that delegitimate its effects. Questions that might reveal
underlying power dimensions of this kind include: Was the act
voluntary and made under just background conditions? What
reasons did the consenter have to consent and what reasons did
they have not to consent? Were there imbalances in the degree
of influence that the parties to the consent relationship exercised
over the formation of consent?
What other structural,
contextual, or environmental factors might generate doubt on
the consenter’s decision to consent?35
To sum-up, it seems that although morally transformative
consent can hardly be defined through lists of conditions, it is
constituted by three factors: (a) what is being transformed
through consent must be capable of being transformed and not
inalienable; (b) acts of consent must not significantly harm third
parties; and (c) consent must be autonomous in a wide sense, i.e.
it must not be the result of nudging, manipulation, false beliefs
or knowledge gaps. In other words, consent has no value if it is
shaped by systemic and invisible exercises of power.
D. Morally Transformative vs. Idealized Consent
Sometimes consent is arguably absent, for example where
Bill is told that if he does not give his snack to John someone will
35. See STEPHEN LUKES, POWER A RADICAL VIEW (2005), ch. 1.
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beat him. Other times consent exists but does not have
transformative moral force, i.e. it does not provide reasons for
accepting transformative consequences. This is where Bill is so
used to being repeatedly bullied that he consents to giving his
snack to John or another innocent schoolboy Alex, having had
the freedom not to do so. In a third set of circumstances, consent
exists and has morally transformative force. This is where for
instance Bill and John are friends and willingly consent to
sharing snacks with one another.
If an act of consent possesses all of the subjective features
of consent outlined above, but lacks the constitutive conditions
that give it morally transformative force, for instance by
operating under unacceptable background conditions, then we
can say that consent does not have morally transformative force.
In many instances, consent that falls short of being
transformative is nonetheless treated as if it were
transformative. In those cases, we call the appearance of
morally significant consent idealized consent.
Treating the bullying case as a valid case of consent is
idealizing Bill’s consent. When ticking a box indicating that we
“have read and understood the terms” we seem to consent to the
terms. But ticking a box resembles the bullying scenario more
than it resembles the third scenario in which Bill and John are
friends and choose to share their snacks in an act of reciprocal
friendship. There are several reasons why this might be so.
Users hardly have access to viable alternatives to existing terms,
and if they do have alternatives, these are often shaped by the
platform itself and are alternatives within a platform service
rather than a fair choice amongst competing platforms. There
are additional concerns relating to lack of visibility, knowledge
asymmetries, and the manipulability of users. We might even
want to go as far as saying that digital notice and consent
schemes have been designed to get individuals to decline
authority over certain matters. We might want to say, then, that
many cases of online consent are cases of idealized consent.
E. Conclusions to Part I
To sum up, saying that an act of consent gives us reason to
normatively reassess the relationship between two or more
parties entails assuming that at least three things are true.
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First, it entails assuming that any states of affairs, rights, and
obligations purportedly being transformed through consent are
of a kind which can be so transformed. Second, it entails
assuming that any effects of consent on persons that are not
parties to the consent relationship are not significantly harmful.
Third, it entails assuming that consent can be largely free and
autonomous and that the background context for consent is not
structurally unjust or skewed in favor of some parties in the
consent relationship. As this article will show, these three
propositions are hardly all true in the platform economy.
As we will see in Part II of this Article, the core issue with
practices of notice and consent in the United States and Europe
is not necessarily that they exist, but rather that they are
premised on the assumption that digital consent can be morally
transformative in the platform economy as long as the conditions
of disclosure can be strengthened. Instead, what the lawyers
and regulators constructing the meaning of legal consent
routinely miss is that in the digital economy legal consent
operates in the absence of all of the three essential elements that
give consent its transformative moral force. In other words,
notice and consent is an instance of idealized consent.
**
II. The Construction of US and EU Notice and Consent
Practices
This section provides an overview of key aspects of the
regulation of consumer privacy through notice and consent on
two sides of the Atlantic: the Federal Trade Commission’s
limited powers to oversee the industry’s “notice and choice”
practices in the United States, and European national data
protection authorities’ powers under the General Data
Protection Regulation.
It shows that in both systems,
enforcement efforts that promote the centrality of information
disclosure and of subjective criteria of informed consent are
based on unreasonable assumptions about these devices’ morally
transformative force. By failing to scrutinize the background
conditions within which notice and consent frameworks come
into play, courts, agencies and regulators who construct the
meaning of legal consent in the platform economy are
legitimizing a practice that appears to have no legitimizing
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moral force. While in the US legal reform that counters
voluntary notice and choice industry practices is needed, the EU
case shows that the deeper issue is not just legal reform, but
rather the need for a change in perception and in regulatory
attitudes toward data intensive industry practices.
A. “Notice and Choice” in the United States
1. Brief History of Voluntary “Notice and Choice”
With the advent of the Internet in the 1990s, the question
of how to protect privacy in a massively replicable and connected
environment became a concern. It quickly became apparent that
pre-Internet legislation would not protect individuals against
new digital privacy interferences.36 Back in the 1970s, the Fair
Information Practices Principles (FIPPs)37 had established the
privacy self-management paradigm in the United States by
introducing three core ideas: notice, consent, and purpose
limitation.38 Under the FIPPs individuals had to be notified
about the data collected about them and about the uses made of
such data, and had to consent to such practices. Such principles
however never made it into a comprehensive U.S. privacy law,
and were instead incorporated in a piecemeal fashion in various
sectoral legislative instruments, the most salient example
possibly being the 1974 Privacy Act which only applies to
Federal Agencies.39
Notwithstanding the United States’ sectoral approach, the
voluntary practice of “notice and choice” progressively
36. See, e.g., In re DoubleClick Privacy Litig., 154 F. Supp. 2d 497
(S.D.N.Y. 2001), (holding that DoubleClick’s cookies did not violate the
Electronic Communication Privacy Act (ECPA) by intercepting a group of
plaintiffs’ communications because the websites had “consented” to
DoubleClick’s access).
37. U.S. Dep’t of Health, Educ., & Welfare, Records, Report of the
Secretary’s Advisory Committee on Automated Personal Data Systems,
Computers, and the Rights of Citizens 41-42 (1973).
38. Marc Rotenberg, Fair Info. Pracs. and the Architecture of Privacy
(What Larry Doesn’t Get), 2001 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 1, 44 (2001). See also
Dennis D. Hirsch, From Individual Control to Social Protection: New
Paradigms for Privacy Law in the Age of Predictive Analytics, MAR. L. REV.
(2019) (draft presented at PLSC 2019, p. 12).
39. Privacy Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-579, 88 Stat. 1896 (codified as
amended in 5 U.S.C. § 552a).
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established itself as the digital privacy management default for
US consumers. Self-certification emerged in the late 1990s
through organizations such as TRUSTe which issued “seals” to
companies that had privacy policies that complied with certain
standards,40 and by 2001, almost all websites had privacy
notices.41 Yet the fact that privacy policies were voluntary
rather than legally mandatory served industry players who
could develop new products without undergoing any regulatory
scrutiny as long as individuals kept opting in.
As a matter of contract law, the enforceability of digital
privacy policies is debated. These policies have been repeatedly
held unenforceable either because they were not considered to
be binding under contract law, or for failure to show the harm
suffered.42 In Dyer, for example, the District Court for North
Dakota held that an airline’s privacy policy was a broad
statement of company policy and did not constitute a contract.43
Scrolling through a web page or clicking on the “download”
button for a new software product has been held insufficient to
constitute assent to the underlying terms and conditions.44 Such
browsewrap agreements have been enforced in cases where the
relevant link or pop-up was repeatedly brought to a consumer’s
attention and the consumer was held to have had an opportunity
to walk away, and therefore, have assented.45 Clickwrap
40. Solove & Hartzog, supra note 6, at 593.
41. Allyson W. Haynes, Online Privacy Policies: Contracting Away Control
over Personal Information?, 111 PENN ST. L. REV. 587, 594 (2007).
42. Solove & Hartzog, supra note 6, at 595–97. See, e.g., In re JetBlue
Corp. Privacy Litig., 379 F. Supp. 2d (E.D.N.Y. 2005); Dyer v. Northwest
Airlines Corps., 334 F. Supp. 2d (D.N.D. 2004); In re Nw. Airlines Privacy
Litig., 2004 WL 1278459 (D. Minn. 2004); Daniels v. JP Morgan Chase Bank,
N.A., 2011 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 4510 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2001); Loeffler v. Ritz-Carlton
Hotel Co., No. 2:06-CV-0333-ECR-LRL, 2006 WL 1796008 (D. Nev. 2006). See
also RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS (AM. LAW INST. TENTATIVE DRAFT, 2019)
(seeking to establish new rules for browserwrap contracts.).
43. Dyer, 334 F. Supp. 2d at 1200.
44. See Specht v. Netscape, 306 F.3d 17 (2d Cir. 2002); Nguyen v. Barnes
& Noble, Inc., 763 F.3d 1171 (9th Cir. 2014); In re Zappos.com, Inc., Customer
Data Security Breach Litig., 893 F. Supp. 2d 1058 (D. Nev. 2012); see also
Aaron Hall, Are Clickwrap or Browsewrap Contracts Enforceable?, AARON
HALL ATTORNEY (November 1, 2018), https://perma.cc/6H9P-XDMQ.
45. See, e.g., Hubbert v. Dell Corp., 835 N.E. 2d 113 (Ill. App. Ct. 5th Dist.
2005). See also ProCD Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996)
(discussing the analogous case of shrinkwrap contracts, which are included
within the sealed package of a new product, and which have been enforced
when there was an opportunity to walk away).
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contracts, which require the positive ticking of a box
unambiguously indicating that one has read and understands
the terms and conditions, have instead generally been
enforced,46 though the case law on this point is surprisingly
limited. Users have, therefore, not been able to rely on contract
law to challenge companies’ privacy policies. Tort law has also
mostly been unhelpful for addressing the limits of privacy policybased governance on the Internet, particularly because
expansive interpretations of privacy torts are generally held to
clash with First Amendment protections.47
Generating accountability around these policies has,
therefore, required the involvement of a different kind of
enforcement apparatus. The United States Federal Trade
Commission (FTC) started to consider consumer privacy
violations in 1995,48 through its powers under Section 5 of the
FTC Act to police “unfair or deceptive” trade practices.49 As
Daniel Solove and Woodrow Hartzog have stated, the plan was
that”[t]he FTC would serve as a backstop to the self-regulatory
regime, providing it with oversight and enforcement – essentially
with enough teeth to give it legitimacy and ensure that people
would view privacy policies as meaningful and trustworthy.”50 In
other words, the FTC’s enforcement would provide legitimacy to
an otherwise unchecked self-governing practice.
The FTC is a civil law enforcement agency that operates by
bringing lawsuits or settling matters directly with the
companies who have committed violations, and does not have
statutory powers to enforce its own agenda. It starts at ten
privacy-related actions per year on average based on its powers
to prevent deceptive and unfair commercial practices.51 The
number seems low considering these are the most effective
means of policing commercial privacy violations in the US, the
number of violations likely to occur every year and the general
46. See, e.g., Feldman v. Google, Inc., 513 F. Supp. 2d 229 (E.D. Pa. 2007).
47. See Alicia Solow-Niederman, Reinvigorating a Common Law
Approach for Data Breaches, YALE L. J. F. (2018); Jack M. Balkin, Information
Fiduciaries and the First Amendment, 49 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1185 (2016).
48. Solove & Hartzog, supra note 6, at 598.
49. 15 U.S.C.S. § 45 (LEXIS through Public Law 116-72).
50. Solove & Hartzog, supra note 6, at 598-9 (emphasis added).
51. Solove & Hartzog, supra note 6, at 600; see also Federal Trade
Commission,
Privacy
&
Data
Security:
Update
2018
(2018),
https://perma.cc/2UGB-KZ23 .
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unavailability of remedies under private law or statute.
Furthermore, the procedure before the FTC normally ends in a
settlement or consent order and not in a decision that can be
appealed. This further limits consumers’ ability to litigate
privacy violations.
The practice of “notice and choice” leaves us with two
questions: (1) Is FTC enforcement bold enough to deter
unwelcome privacy intrusions, or does it remain a performative
façade?; and (2) If voluntary “notice and choice” practices are
insufficient to address consumer harms, what kind of legislation
is needed?
2. The FTC’s Enforcement Action against “Deceptive” and
“Unfair” Trade Practices
In 1998 the FTC began its enforcement against “deceptive”
practices, with a weak enforcement apparatus and a limited
scope of action.52 Its theory of deception developed to cover not
only promises that had been breached, but also deceptive
inducements by companies to disclose customer data and cases
of insufficient notice and disclosure in relation to privacyinvasive activities. Deception is made of three elements: (a) a
representation, omission, or practice likely to mislead the
consumer; (b) it was reasonable for someone within the target
consumer group to be misled; and (c) the representation,
omission, or practice was “material” in the sense that it was
likely to affect a consumer’s choice regarding products or
services.53 The deception doctrine entrenches the assumption
that information can solve consumer privacy issues: the key
element is the disclosure or its absence, and the main question
is whether the disclosure was sufficient and accurate. If a
practice has been properly disclosed and consumers have
accepted its related risks, there is no reason for the FTC to use
its deception powers.
Yet the FTC also has “unfairness” powers. Dennis Hirsch
has argued that contrary to the FTC’s deceptiveness doctrine,
the unfairness doctrine can address most algorithmic privacy
52. Solove & Hartzog, supra note 6.
53. See U.S. Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC Policy Statement on Deception
(1983), https://perma.cc/826X-X9YN.
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harms.54 As it currently stands, however, the doctrine has a
quite limited scope. A practice will be deemed unfair if it “causes
or is likely to cause substantial injury to consumers which is not
reasonably avoidable by consumers themselves and not
outweighed by countervailing benefits to consumers or to
competition.”55 In practice, this three-part test, and in particular
the fact that the injury must be reasonably unavoidable, heavily
constrains the FTC’s scope of action. If a consumer had options
to choose a different competitor or product, or if the injury was
otherwise avoidable through a proper exercise of judgment, then
the FTC has no power to intervene.
Data practices, however, can be very harmful to consumers
even when they are disclosed, consented to, and hypothetically
avoidable. As highlighted by behavioral economists: people
frequently do not choose the best for themselves. They rarely
read privacy policies before opting in, and when they do, they
fail to understand them.56 There are various psychological
factors at play when choosing to opt in,57 e.g. incompatible
preferences or ethical stances, contradictory needs, internal
biases, or biases in the choice architecture.58 Information that
is complete can be presented in ways that manipulate
individuals to opt in.
It has been argued that the FTC’s unfairness doctrine
already covers latent manipulation.59
It encompasses
behavioral considerations and is evolving toward encompassing
54. Dennis D. Hirsch, From Individual Control to Social Protection: New
Paradigms for Privacy Law in the Age of Predictive Analytics, MD. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2019).
55. 15 U.S.C.A. § 45(n) (West, West Law through P.L. 116-72).
56. See, e.g., Omri Ben-Shahar & Carl Schneider, The Failure of
Mandated Disclosure, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 647 (2011).
57. Alessandro Acquisti, Laura Brandimante & George Lowenstein,
Privacy and Human Behavior in the Age of Information, 347 SCIENCE 509
(2015).
58. See Alessandro Acquisti, Nudging Privacy, 7 IEEE SECURITY &
PRIVACY 82 (2009); See also Susan Athey, Christian Catalini & Catherine
Tucker, The Digital Privacy Paradox: Small Money, Small Costs, Small Talk
1-26 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 23488, 2017),
https://perma.cc/9UNW-K9SL; SUNSTEIN & THALER, infra note 201; Erik
Brynjolfsson, Felix Eggers & Avinash Gannamaneni, Using Massive Online
Choice Experiments to Measure Changes in Well-being 1-74 (Nat’l Bureau of
Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 24514, 2018), https://perma.cc/T8Z8NU7N.
59. Hirsch, supra note 54.
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predictive analytics and behavioral advertising practices.
Practices that have been considered unfair by the FTC include
retroactive policy changes,60 deceitful data collection,61 improper
uses of data,62 unfair default settings,63 and unfair information
security practices.64 It remains to be seen how innovatively the
FTC will interpret its powers in future. Still, a regulatory
apparatus premised on the supremacy of consumer choice and
on the importance of informational disclosures arguably cannot
go far enough in the digital economy. The FTC’s powers under
section 5 are based on the assumption that consumers must bear
the ultimate burden of privacy governance in the digital
economy. Yet individuals are not always the most appropriate
locus of governance in a platform context, particularly if choice
is likely to be distorted by power asymmetries and unjust
background conditions.
3. Facebook and Beyond
The FTC’s current unfairness doctrine is the result of an
evolutionary process, yet one that hardly seems sufficient to
fully protect consumer privacy in the United States because it
remains centered on individual choice and information
disclosures. A salient example of the FTC’s enforcement powers
in action will serve to illustrate this argument.
In In re Facebook, Inc., the FTC found that Facebook had
not properly notified its users of changes to its privacy settings,
and that some of these changes constituted deceptive and unfair
practices.65 The new policy was considered deceptive because it
inaccurately informed users that they could restrict access to
profile information,66 and because it failed to disclose the fact
that users could no longer restrict access to their Name, Profile

60. See, e.g., In re Gateway Learning Corp., 138 F.T.C. 443 (2004); In re
Facebook Inc., 2012 WL 3518628 (2012) [hereinafter Facebook Complaint].
61. See, e.g., In re Aspen Way Enters., Inc., 155 F.T.C. 483 (2013).
62. Id.
63. See, e.g., In re Sony BMG Music Entm’t, 2007 WL 1942983 (2007).
64. See, e.g., United States v. Rental Research Servs., Inc., FTC File No.
072-3228 (D. Minn. Mar. 5, 2009).
65. Facebook Complaint, supra note 60.
66. Id. at 6–7.
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Picture, Gender, Friend List, and Pages.67 The policy was also
considered unfair because it retroactively designated as public,
information that had previously been held private, without
users’ informed consent.68 The unfairness count could have been
avoided if users had given informed consent to the redesignation, something which Facebook would have had no
difficulty obtaining. The case ended with a Consent Order,69
which included disclosure obligations, obligations to make
certain information private, and also the requirement to
establish “a comprehensive privacy program” to address some of
the violations,70 coupled with the obligation to carry out impact
assessments twice a year for twenty years.71
Notwithstanding these seemingly stringent requirements,
in
March
2018
a
personality
quiz
app
called
“thisisyourdigitallife” was revealed to have been installed by
300,000 people in 2013, enabling the data analytics and voter
profiling firm Cambridge Analytica to obtain information about
those 300,000 Facebook users and all of their Facebook friends.72
In total this amounted to approximately 87 million user
profiles.73 In December 2015, Facebook removed the app which
was purportedly in breach of its Platform Policies and demanded
assurances from all parties involved that the user information
had been destroyed. All parties certified to Facebook that they
had destroyed the data, and the matter was put to rest.74
Cambridge Analytica, however, had not deleted all user data,75
67. Id. at 9.
68. Id.
69. In the Matter of Facebook Inc., F.T.C. No. 092-3184 No. C-4365
(F.T.C., July 27, 2012) (Decision and Order).
70. Id. at 5.
71. Id. at 6.
72. Paul Grewal, Suspending Cambridge Analytica and SCL Group from
Facebook,
FACEBOOK
NEWSROOM
(Mar.
17,
2018
9:50
AM),
https://perma.cc/JLJ8-HSJ9; Facebook: Transparency and Use of Consumer
Data Before the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 115th Cong. (2018)
(Questions for the record response by Mark Zuckerberg, Chairman & Chief
Executive Officer, Facebook).
73. Nadeem Badshah, Facebook to Contact 87 Million Users Affected by
Data Breach, THE GUARDIAN (Apr. 8, 2018 6:40 PM), https://perma.cc/F6AL72NS.
74. Facebook: Transparency and Use of Consumer Data, 115th Cong.
(2018) (Questions for the record response by Mark Zuckerberg Hearing before
the US House of Representatives Committee on Energy and Commerce).
75. Grewal, supra note 72.
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and users were never notified of the breach or the data transfers
until a leak in early 2018 caused public outrage. Suddenly
pressured for answers, Facebook offered partial responses.76
Paul Grewal for instance asserted that there had been no breach
on Facebook’s part:
The claim that this is a data breach is completely
false. [Cambridge Analytica] requested and
gained access to information from users who chose
to sign up to his app, and everyone involved gave
their consent. People knowingly provided their
information, no systems were infiltrated, and no
passwords or sensitive pieces of information were
stolen or hacked.77
Zeynep Tufekci reacted:
Mr. Grewal is right: This wasn’t a breach in the
technical sense. It is something even more
troubling: an all-too-natural consequence of
Facebook’s business model, which involves having
people go to the site for social interaction, only to
be quietly subjected to an enormous level of
surveillance. (. . .)
Despite Facebook’s claims to the contrary,
everyone involved in the Cambridge Analytica
data-siphoning incident did not give his or her
“consent” — at least not in any meaningful sense
of the word. It is true that if you found and read
all the fine print on the site, you might have
noticed that in 2014, your Facebook friends had
the right to turn over all your data through such
apps. (Facebook has since turned off this feature.)
If you had managed to make your way through a
bewildering array of options, you might have even
discovered how to turn the feature off. This wasn’t
informed consent. This was the exploitation of
76. Id.
77. Id.
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user data and user trust.78
A reform of the FTC’s enforcement of consumer privacy thus
seemed in order. However creative the 2012 Consent Order had
been, it had dramatically failed to prevent the harms caused to
consumers from 2013 to 2018. Religious faith in voluntary
notice and choice provided Facebook with a shield to hide behind
and continue to pursue its corporate interests on the backs of
users.
One year later, the FTC fined Facebook five billion dollars
for non-compliance with the Consent Order and for other
violations under Sections 5 and 16 of the FTC Act.79 The
settlement introduced a series of innovative compliance
measures including monitoring of data sharing arrangements
with third party developers and app providers; new channels to
hold Facebook accountable, including a new Board of Directors
committee focused on privacy risks; quarterly compliance
certifications; and enhanced FTC access to internal documents.80
Still, the measures were criticized as insufficient.81 Amongst
other shortcomings was the recognition that the Order remained
the result of a voluntary settlement, accepted, and acceptable to
Facebook itself:
Our colleagues lament that the Order does not do
more. (. . .) As a civil law enforcement agency (and
not a regulator), we can only get what we can win
in litigation or via hard-fought negotiations. The
FTC does not have the authority to regulate by
fiat. The extent to which Facebook, or any other
78. See Zeynep Tufekci, Facebook’s Surveillance Machine, N.Y. TIMES
(Mar. 19, 2018), https://perma.cc/2ERY-T5TE.
79. Complaint for Civil Penalties, Injunction, and Other Relief at 1, USA
v. Facebook, Inc., No. 91-cv-2184, 2019 WL 3318596 (D.D.C., July 24, 2019).
80. Stipulation Order For Civil Penalty, Monetary Judgement, and
Injunctive Relief, United States v. Facebook, Inc. (D.C. 2009) (No. 19-cv-2184).
81. Dissenting Statement of Commissioner Rohit Chopra Regarding the
Matter of Facebook Inc., No. 092-3184 No. C-4365 (July 24, 2019),
https://perma.cc/C59W-JUZE; Dissenting Statement of Commissioner Rebecca
Kelly Slaughter Regarding the Matter of FTC vs. Facebook, No. 092-3184 No.
C-4365 (July 24, 2019), https://perma.cc/YD7L-DW33; see, e.g., Siva
Vaidhyanathan, Billion-dollar Fines Can’t Stop Google and Facebook. That’s
Peanuts for Them, THE GUARDIAN (July 26, 2019), https://perma.cc/2FXVM9BB.
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company, should be able to collect, use, aggregate,
and monetize data, is something Congress should
evaluate in its consideration of federal privacy
legislation. Our 100 year-old statute does not give
us free rein to impose these restrictions.82
A self-regulatory and individual choice-centric approach to
data and consumer harms remains predominant in the United
States. While legislative progress has been made at state level,
notably with the California Consumer Privacy Act (CCPA) which
came into force in early 2020, Federal legislation is yet to be
seen. As long as we rely on voluntary disclosures and individual
choice, the full scope of the acts and activities we recognize as
abusive will never be addressed.
B. The European Approach to Consent
1. Consent and Control under the GDPR
Contrary to the United States approach, which favors
voluntary privacy safeguards, European data protection law has
developed as a principled umbrella body of law, following two
influences. First, the FIPPs, as first formulated in a report of
US Department of Health Education and Welfare in 197383 and
as subsequently reconfigured in the OECD’s 1980 Guidelines on
the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Data Flows of
Personal Data,84 came to form the backbone of European data
protection law. Their three core principles of notice, consent,
and purpose limitation still form the skeleton of EU data
protection today. Another important factor was the German
Constitutional Court’s jurisprudence on the right to
informational self-determination, which centered around the
imperative of affording individuals the power to control
82. Statement of Chairman Joe Simons and Commissioners Noah Joshua
Phillips and Christine S. Wilson Regarding the Matter of Facebook, Inc., No.
092-3184 No. C-4365 (July 24, 2019), https://perma.cc/9PWC-ZMVK.
83. U.S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare, Records,
Computers, and the Rights of Citizens: Report of the Secretary’s Advisory
Comm. On Automated Personal Data Systems, No. (OS)73-94 (1973).
84. OECD, OECD Guidelines on the Protection of Privacy and
Transborder Flows of Personal Data (1980), https://perma.cc/RM25-2ZPF.
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information about themselves.85 “Natural persons should have
control of their own personal data,” establishes Recital 7 of the
EU General Data Protection Regulation, the much acclaimed
new European umbrella privacy law.86 The idea of informed
consent under EU data protection law is closely tied to that of
informational self-determination. As explained by the Article 29
Working Party: “[t]he notion of consent is traditionally linked
with the idea that the data subject should be in control of the use
that is being made of his data. From a fundamental rights
perspective, control exercised through consent is an important
concept.”87
In May 2018, the EU GDPR came into force, repealing the
previous data protection regime88 and introducing a radical
reconfiguration of privacy protection worldwide. It reinforced
the requirements for informed consent as one of the bases, and
not the only basis,89 for legitimate data processing, and
introduced new inalienable data subject rights that cannot be
waived by consent. It also expanded rights to access information
about the personal data being processed, rights to rectify and
erase personal data, the right to data portability, and the right
to have human intervention in AI-based decision-making.90 The
GDPR also introduced new compliance mechanisms: internal
codes of conduct for companies;91 data protection impact
assessments (DPIAs) whereby companies are encouraged to
describe and evaluate aspects of their data processing practices
likely to result in high risk;92 data protection seals and

85. BVERFGE, 1 BVR 484/83, Oct. 18-19, 1983, 65 BVerfGE 1, available in
German at: https://perma.cc/LT44-NX3K. See also Herbert Burkert, Privacy Data Protection: A German/European Perspective, SECOND SYMPOSIUM OF THE
GERMAN AMERICAN ACADEMIC COUNCIL’S PROJECT “GLOBAL NETWORKS AND
LOCAL VALUES”, Woods Hole, Massachusetts 44 (1999).
86. Gen. Data Protection Reg., supra note 8, at art. 7.
87. EU Article 29 Working Party, Opinion 15/2011 on the definition of
consent, 01197/11/EN WP187, at 8 (July 13, 2011).
88. 1995 O. J. (L281) Directive 95/46/EC.
89. Gen. Data Protection Reg., supra note 8, at art. 6.
90. Gen. Data Protection Reg., supra note 8, at arts. 12-23.
91. Id. at art. 40.
92. Id. at art. 35. See EU Article 29 Working Party, Guidelines on Data
Protection Impact Assessment (DPIA) and Determining Whether Processing is
“likely to result in a high risk” for the Purposes of Regulation 2016/679, 17, WP
248
(Apr.
4,
2017),
https://ec.europa.eu/newsroom/article29/itemdetail.cfm?item_id=611236.
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certifications overseen by apposite certification bodies;93 and
perhaps most importantly data protection by design and by
default which for example require setting up appropriate
internal data minimization standards.94 The Regulation further
requires each EU Member State to put in place a National Data
Protection Authority (NDA) to ensure “the consistent
application of [GDPR] throughout the Union.”95
Under the GDPR, informed consent is one of six bases for
lawful processing, the others being that the processing is
necessary for the performance of a contract, for compliance with
a legal obligation, or a closed list of other reasons including the
pursuit of a legitimate interest of the person or entity
responsible for data processing or a third party.96 Consent is
required for the processing of special categories of personal data,
for example data relating to racial characteristics, political or
religious beliefs, and genetic and biometric data,97 but it is not
required for the processing of other data which can be carried
out under any of the other five bases of lawful processing. The
GDPR defines consent as “any freely given, specific, informed
and unambiguous indication of the data subject’s wishes by
which he or she, by a statement or by a clear affirmative action,
signifies agreement to the processing of personal data relating to
him or her.”98 To be valid under the GDPR, an expression of
consent must be informed, it must be specific and unambiguous,
meaning that it cannot be sufficient to present individuals with
pre-ticked boxes or to bundle consent with other actions,99 and it
must be freely given, in that it must provide individuals with real

93. Gen. Data Protection Reg., supra note 8, at arts. 42-43.
94. Gen. Data Protection Reg., supra note 8, at art. 25. See also Gen. Data
Protection Reg., supra note 8, at art. 5(c) (discussing the principle of data
minimization in the GDPR).
95. Gen. Data Protection Reg., supra note 8, at art. 51(2). See Gen. Data
Protection Reg., supra note 8, at arts. 51-59 (explaining the powers and
jurisdiction of national NDAs).
96. Gen. Data Protection Reg., supra note 8, at art. 6.
97. Gen. Data Protection Reg., supra note 8, at art, 9.
98. Gen. Data Protection Reg., supra note 8, at art. 4(11).
99. See Opinion of Advocate General Szpunar, Planet49 GmbH v
Bundesverband der Verbraucherzentralen und Verbraucherverbände –
Verbraucherzentrale Bundesverband e.V, Case C-673/17, ECLI:EU:C:2019:246
(Mar. 21, 2019) (explaining the principles of specific consent and ambiguity),
https://perma.cc/5K6D-DHQQ.
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choice and control, and must be uncoerced.100 Article 7 of the
GDPR, which specifies additional conditions for the validity of
consent, adds that in assessing whether consent is freely given,
“utmost account shall be taken” of whether the processing is
“necessary for the performance of that contract.”101 This amounts
to saying that obtaining free and valid consent becomes more
burdensome for a company as the data it acquires becomes
peripheral to the services it provides. Article 7 also specifies that
there is a right to withdraw consent at any time,102 and that
consent “shall be presented in a manner which is clearly
distinguishable from the other matters, in an intelligible and
easily accessible form, using clear and plain language.”103
EU data protection law as we see it today is characterized
by fundamental rights protection coupled with a strong
emphasis on informed consent, user choice, and control. Both
consent and data subject rights assume that the individual can
and should be the ultimate decision-maker regarding opaque
commercial data practice, thus neglecting the power
asymmetries and information externalities that make
individual-centric decision-making objectionable. It must be
noted that this state of affairs is not a necessity; in theory EU
data protection could be seen as centrally concerned with privacy
defaults and one could understand consent under the GDPR as
applying only in exceptional circumstances. Yet the reality of
the law’s current interpretation and implementation is different.
While the Regulation does include compliance measures that go
beyond individual control over data, the way such measures are
to be implemented is still far from clear and so far remains up to
the voluntary efforts of companies themselves. Much of the case
law on the GDPR since its coming into force has scrutinized the
question of what constitutes legally compliant informed consent,
without sufficiently questioning whether consent is the most
appropriate basis for legitimating processing in given contexts.
As the GDPR’s scope and mode of application is progressively
clarified through the intervention of courts, regulators, and civil
society amongst others, a shift away from consent and control
100. See generally EU Article 29 Working Party, Guidelines on Consent
Under Regulation 2016/679, 17/EN WP259 (Apr. 10, 2018).
101. Gen. Data Protection Reg., supra note 8, at art. 7(4).
102. Gen. Data Protection Reg., supra note 8, at art. 7(3).
103. Gen. Data Protection Reg., supra note 8, at art. 7(2).
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seems unlikely, especially as these notions leak into neighboring
legal fields such as competition enforcement. In the long run,
this enforcement strategy is likely to benefit companies more
than consumers. In what follows, we explore two cases that
illustrate the shortcomings of an EU approach centered on
individual informed consent.

2. Disclosure and Transparency: the French CNIL’s
Decision against Google
As the GDPR was coming into force, the French Data
Protection Regulation, the “Commission nationale de
l’informatique et des libertés” (CNIL) received two complaints,
respectively by NOYB a non-profit based in Austria and the
French la Quadrature du Net, both claiming that Google did not
have a sound legal basis under the GDPR for engaging in
processing of personal information as it did. On January 21,
2019, the French authority issued its first decision under the
GDPR, and first amongst EU DPAs, imposing a fine of 50 million
Euro against Google for failing to comply with the requirements
for valid consent under the GDPR.104
The substantive ruling in this case consists of two parts.
First, CNIL decided that Google had failed to comply with its
obligation to provide access to transparent information about
data processing to users, because the information available to
users was too disseminated, and was not clear and
comprehensive. Second, CNIL found that Google’s targeted
advertising practices were not covered by valid consent. It found
that consent not only failed to be “informed,” but that it also
failed to be sufficiently “specific” and “unambiguous” under the
GDPR.
We here expand on CNIL’s approach further. First,
therefore, CNIL found that Google did not make the required
information easily accessible to users under Articles 12 and 13

104. Commission nationale de l’informatique et des libertés [CNIL]
[French Data Protection Authority] Délibération de la formation restreinte n°
SAN – 2019-001 prononçant une sanction pécuniaire à l’encontre de la société
GOOGLE LLC, SAN-2019-001 (January 21, 2019), https://perma.cc/VHK7YUFE.
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of the GDPR.105 Information essential to the exercise of data
subject rights, such as the purposes of data processing, the
modalities of storage and the types of personal data used in
targeted advertising could not be accessed in one single place
and were instead disseminated across several documents,
sometimes requiring up to five or six steps for a user to get
relevant information on his or her data.
Further, the
information provided by Google was not always clear or
comprehensive. Google’s processing operations span across
about twenty services and entail the collection and use of a wide
range of data, including data directly provided by users such as
name and date of birth, data generated through a user’s
activities such as geolocation, and data inferred on the basis of
other data. CNIL found that the information Google provided to
users was too generic and vague to properly notify individuals of
the processing at stake and of the importance of their consent to
the practices’ legitimacy.
Second, CNIL found that Google failed to obtain valid
105. See Gen. Data Protection Reg., supra note 8, at art. 12(1): “The
controller shall take appropriate measures to provide any information referred
to in Articles 13 and 14 and any communication under Articles 15 to 22 and 34
relating to processing to the data subject in a concise, transparent, intelligible
and easily accessible form, using clear and plain language, in particular for
any information addressed specifically to a child. The information shall be
provided in writing, or by other means, including, where appropriate, by
electronic means. When requested by the data subject, the information may be
provided orally, provided that the identity of the data subject is proven by other
means.” Article 13(1) GDPR reads: “Where personal data relating to a data
subject are collected from the data subject, the controller shall, at the time when
personal data are obtained, provide the data subject with all of the following
information:
the identity and the contact details of the controller and, where
applicable, of the controller’s representative;
the contact details of the data protection officer, where applicable;
the purposes of the processing for which the personal data are intended
as well as the legal basis for the processing;
where the processing is based on point (f) of Article 6(1), the legitimate
interests pursued by the controller or by a third party;
the recipients or categories of recipients of the personal data, if any;
where applicable, the fact that the controller intends to transfer
personal data to a third country or international organisation [sic] and
the existence or absence of an adequacy decision by the Commission, or
in the case of transfers referred to in Article 46 or 47, or the second
subparagraph of Article 49(1), reference to the appropriate or suitable
safeguards and the means by which to obtain a copy of them or where
they have been made available.”
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consent from users, and thus failed to engage in lawful
processing when it relied on consent as a basis for lawfulness
under Articles 6 and 7 of the GDPR. Consent was considered
invalid because it was not sufficiently informed (the information
provided by Google to its users was lacking in accessibility and
clarity) and it was insufficiently “specific” or “unambiguous.”
When creating an account, users could click on the button “more
options” to access certain data processing defaults and untick
them. However, CNIL considered that linking to pre-ticked ads
personalization defaults placed an excessive burden on users’
ability to control processing on their personal data, and that
under those circumstances consent to the defaults could not be
considered specific and unambiguous.
The requirements on information access, disclosure, and
consent that underlie the decision are revealing. While CNIL’s
intention was to protect individual consumers, its decision
appears problematic on at least two fronts. First, the findings
are highly design-sensitive. CNIL grounds its arguments on
how information is presented: browsing to a different page, the
number of steps needed to access information, etc. These criteria
may be valuable, but they are ephemeral and easy to design
around. One could imagine information that is perfectly
readable on the front page and yet remains impenetrable.
Second, transparency on Google’s behavioral advertising
practices is unlikely to ever be achieved, let alone through
disclosure and consent. Google has no incentive to disclose full
and complete information about its most valued business model
to its customers, users and competitors, and it has too much
power to affect the shape of any disclosure it makes. The
information Google will disclose to users is unlikely to change
much if the practice of notice and consent remains as it currently
is.
The problem is that by focusing on perfecting consent so that
it complies with idealized informed consent, CNIL is leaving
behind an essential part of the structural injustice. The problem
is not that individuals consent to opaque behavioral advertising
as much as it is that behavioral advertising is harmful and
should not be engaged in as extensively as it currently is. As
said, consent cannot serve a legitimizing role unless it operates
under just background conditions. Here, it is clear that users
will keep accepting the terms set by Google in order to access its
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services, and Google’s interests will always prevail over any
individual’s interests in the information disclosure. CNIL’s
focus on the criteria and nature of volition and informed consent
seems to add moral legitimacy to a practice that acts as an empty
vessel. This approach will not do justice to individuals in the
long run.
3. Monopoly Power: The German Bundeskartellamt
Decision against Facebook
Not long after CNIL’s decision, in February 2019 another
decision considered a platform’s breach of EU consent
requirements, this time however it was issued by an antitrust
authority.106
In this much awaited case the German
Competition Authority, or Bundeskartellamt, found that
Facebook had violated German antitrust law by forcing those
who wanted to access the Facebook platform to accept—through
notice and consent—certain data collection and use practices
such as the combination of data gathered through Facebookowned services including WhatsApp and Instagram and third
party websites in one Facebook user-account. Much of the
Bundeskartellamt’s case is premised on user-control and
consent, yet this time the analysis is pushed further and also
scrutinizes the power asymmetries at play between users and
Facebook. In the authority’s words, “[t]here is no effective
consent to the users’ information being collected if their consent
is a prerequisite for using the Facebook.com service in the first
place.”107
In the decision, the Bundeskartellamt first finds that
Facebook is dominant on the market for social networking

106. Prohibition Decision: Facebook Inc. i.a. - The use of abusive business
terms pursuant to Section 19 (1) GWB, Bundeskartellamt (June 2, 2019),
https://perma.cc/D8PK-D82G; See Bundeskartellamt, Case Summary:
Facebook, Exploitative business terms pursuant to Section 19(1) GWB for
inadequate data processing (Feb. 15, 2019), https://perma.cc/JJN9-8URN;
Bundeskartellamt, Press Release Bundeskartellamt prohibits Facebook from
combining user data from different sources (Feb. 7, 2019),
https://perma.cc/33YH-PDB9; Bundeskartellamt, Background information of
the Facebook proceeding (Feb. 7, 2019), https://perma.cc/HS94-EJNU.
107. See Bundeskartellamt, Case Summary: Facebook, Exploitative
business terms pursuant to Section 19(1) GWB for inadequate data processing
1 (Feb. 15, 2019).
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services in Germany, with a market share of daily active users
of ninety-five percent.108 Second, it finds that Facebook abuses
its dominance by engaging in an abusive data policy, i.e.
collecting user and device-related data from a variety of external
sources, and conditioning access to their platform to their
combining it with Facebook profile data.
The
Bundeskartellamt’s foundational philosophy in this case is that
“[i]n order to protect the fundamental right to informational selfdetermination,109 data protection law provides the individual
with the right to decide freely and without coercion on the
processing of his or her personal data.”110
The competition authority then argues that reliance on EU
data protection law as a standard for determining the existence
of exploitative abuse is justified and explains that consent under
the GDPR cannot be voluntary and freely given if “users consent
to Facebook’s terms and conditions for the sole purpose of
concluding the contract.”111 Further, none of the other bases for
lawful processing under Article 6 GDPR are present,
particularly as the processing of all that user-data cannot be
considered necessary for the performance of the users’ contract
with Facebook. Thus, Facebook’s processing violates data
protection laws.
The further step the Bundeskartellamt takes in its analysis
is to consider such violation as evidence of an abuse of
dominance, stating that what was required under German law
was a showing that dominance and the violation of German law
and data protection rules are causally related.112 The way the
authority explains this causality is two-fold. First, a reason why
consent cannot be considered voluntary and freely given is
precisely because Facebook is dominant on the market for social
networking services. If users had more options to avoid
Facebook’s collection and processing of combinations of data
108. Id. at 3–7.
109. In 1983, the German Constitutional Court developed the right to
informational self-determination relying on Articles 1 and 2 of the German
Federal Constitution. BVerfGE, 1 BvR 484/83, Oct. 18-19, 1984, 65 BVerfGE
1, available in German at: https://perma.cc/LT44-NX3K.
110. See Bundeskartellamt, Case Summary: Facebook, Exploitative
business terms pursuant to Section 19(1) GWB for inadequate data processing
8 (Feb. 15, 2019).
111. Id. at 10.
112. Id. at 11.
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then it is possible that there would be valid consent. Second,
those unlawful contracts allow Facebook to access, collect, and
benefit from larger amounts of data than its competitors and
arguably larger amounts of data than its users would agree to.
The authority does not consider the particulars of how
Facebook’s exploitative data policies (advertising, profiling) can
harm individuals other than stating that the combination of
these factors undermines users’ ability to “decide autonomously
on the disclosure of their data.”113 In other words, the
competition harm in question is a loss of user control over how
their data is processed. Andreas Mundt, President of the
Bundeskartellamt, characterized the decision’s effect as an
“internal
divestiture
of
Facebook’s
data.”114
The
Bundeskartellamt’s goal in the decision in other words was to
make the combination of data from different services across the
web more difficult, and to give individuals real choices to
disaggregate those datasets.
While combining competition law and privacy in one
decision is a very interesting new development, the decision’s
focus on consent and loss of control appears to go both too far
and not far enough. It allegedly goes too far because it subsumes
questions of data protection within the competition law analysis,
a move that has been harshly contested on the grounds that it
conflates two fields of enquiry, uncovers questions that
competition law is unequipped to address, and leads to
jurisdictional inconsistencies that would be better addressed
through a different route.115
The main problem, however, is that the decision does not go
far enough. On the one hand, the authority’s approach is
ambiguous on whether Facebook’s monopoly status
113. Id. at 12.
114. See Bundeskartellamt Press Release Bundeskartellamt prohibits
Facebook from combining user data from different sources (Feb. 7, 2019),
https://perma.cc/33YH-PDB9.
115. See, e.g., Giuseppe Colangelo & Mariateresa Maggiolino, Data
Accumulation and the Privacy-Antitrust Interface: Insights from the Facebook
Case for the EU and the U.S., 8 INT’L DATA PRIVACY L. 224 (2018); Jakob
Kucharczyk, The German FCO’s Facebook Case: Blurring The Line Between
Competition And Data Protection Enforcement, Disruptive Competition Project
(Feb. 8, 2019), https://perma.cc/M9E8-JJYE; Geoffrey Manne, Doing Double
Damage: The German Competition Authority’s Facebook Decision Manages to
Undermine both Antitrust and Data Protection Law, TRUST ON THE MARKET
BLOG (Feb. 8, 2019), https://perma.cc/4RSS-U8AP.

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol40/iss1/7

38

348

PACE LAW REVIEW

40.1

automatically makes users’ consent less free and voluntary. In
fact, larger companies hardly violate data protection law more
consistently than smaller ones,116 even though they do have the
ability to access, process, and control more information and,
thus, arguably have greater compliance obligations. The
Bundeskartellamt’s approach, however, does not really tackle
that point. Its analysis is that dominance means that Facebook
should not be able to impose unfair terms such as default data
combinations as part of their terms of service, without offering
viable alternatives and opt-outs.
If the analysis is limited to giving individuals more options
to aggregate and disaggregate datasets, than in important ways
it seems to undermine the argument about power asymmetries.
Indeed, the authority oscillates between two kinds of harms: it
insists that the problem is coercion of users into an unfair
bargain, yet defines the harm as a loss of control recoverable
through the design of more choices at the consent stage. A power
imbalance requires more than a set of options to choose from,
which is the remedy the authority puts forward in this case. In
light of Facebook’s power, increasing the number of choices will
not solve the problem; users will keep opting for the least
burdensome option amongst those that Facebook deems
tolerable. Choice and control should imply an ability to
negotiate or walk away, but users do not have it, nor will they.
Decisions that focus on “voluntary consent” as the desired
goal, makes authorities vulnerable to responses, such as
Facebook’s public response in this case, that users in fact have a
lot of choice on these markets, and that other options are only a
click away.117 The decision has now been overturned by the
Düsseldorf Higher Regional Court, which has offered a narrow
analysis of consent and has entirely neglected the question of
power in the platform economy.118 In proceedings for interim
relief, the German court states that individuals in fact decide to
opt into Facebook’s terms autonomously, and that Facebook’s

116. Justus Haucap, The Facebook Decision: First Thoughts, D’KART
ANTITRUST BLOG (Feb. 7, 2019), https://perma.cc/CB7N-FZ2W.
117. Yvonne Cunnane & Nikhil Shanbhag, Why We Disagree With the
Bundeskartellamt,
FACEBOOK
NEWSROOM
(Feb.
7,
2019),
https://perma.cc/XG8R-D9EH.
118. Oberlandesgericht [OLG], Aug. 26, 2019, VI-Kart 1/19 (V),
https://perma.cc/QGR7-FR54.
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data collection and combination practices have not been proved
to harm Facebook’s competitors; concluding that the German
Bundeskartellamt’s decision is, therefore, not good law.
The court’s ruling confirms that correcting power
asymmetries in the platform economy through consent is a
fraught approach.
No matter what we think of the
Bundeskartellamt’s innovative take, focusing on consent as a
means of protecting individuals against platform power is
reductive or vulnerable to criticism or both. We must become
readier, as a society, to move beyond informed consent and to
ask what kind of platform economy individuals deserve,
regardless of the choices they might be able or willing to make
in such economy.
C. Conclusions to Part II
Regulators and courts in both the United States and Europe
focus narrowly on the criteria for freely given consent instead of
asking whether the practice of consent is justified in the
platform economy. Assuming the moral salience of a practice
without asking whether it is justified in the circumstances, i.e.
whether the background conditions for having the practice in the
first place are just, unreasonably legitimizes it.
It might be argued that the GDPR’s approach protects users
and that it aims to achieve privacy by default with limited
exceptions that consumers can consent to. This aspirational
vision hardly matches the way the legislation is currently
interpreted and complied with.
Further, as long as
voluntariness and disclosure are considered to be paramount,
underlying questions of power and platform justice will remain
obscured. This should serve as a warning for US policy-makers
currently considering federal privacy legislation.
In what follows it will be shown that we in fact lack reason
to understand the practice of notice and consent as legitimate in
context under either of these regimes. Taking the three
conditions for the morally transformative force of consent in
turn, it will be argued that the legal practice we described does
not take place under just background conditions in the platform
economy, it attempts to transform things which cannot be so
transformed, and it unreasonably affects third parties who lack
a chance to be heard under the circumstances.
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III. What Should Consent Protect Us Against?
Upon consideration, the legal practice of notice and consent
seems a performative facade. However, our conclusion in this
regard may be wrong and requires careful examination. To
understand if there is reason to find the practice morally
relevant in the platform economy, the first question we must ask
is what consent is supposed to enable us to do. What does it
allow us to protect and what can it shield us from? Considering
notice and consent from this perspective allows us to realize that
little of what consent allows us to do in fact serves our interests,
and little of what we really need to do is enabled through notice
and consent. Consent enables us to access a platform in
exchange for access to our data, yet it hardly transforms our
relationship with platforms in a way that benefits us more than
them, and it hardly seems capable of protecting us against
abusive and covert interferences. This discrepancy between
what we have reason to want and what we actually tend to get
through individual acts of consent will serve as important
evidence to ground an argument about platform power and the
lack of morally transformative force of consent in this context.
A. Interests in Data
Interests are what people value and care about. Interests
here will not be understood as what people selfishly or
subjectively care about but rather as things people objectively
have reason to value.119 Interests in dataflows and in the digital
infrastructure can broadly be divided into three classes: (a)
economic interests, individual or collective, over data and
infrastructure as productive assets, including interests in the
creation of new value through those data and infrastructure; (b)
non-economic interests, mostly personal, in data or other
infrastructure as constitutive of and/or significantly related to
119. In this sense, I adopt Thomas M. Scanlon’s understanding of
interests as objective things we have reason to value. See THOMAS M. SCANLON,
WHAT WE OWE TO EACH OTHER (1998). This is in contrast to other views of
interests as selfish motives. See DAVID HUME, ENQUIRIES CONCERNING HUMAN
UNDERSTANDING AND CONCERNING THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS (1975).
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the shaping of one’s own person in one’s own eyes or in the eyes
of others; and (c) interests, mostly collective, in using data or
infrastructure for the pursuit of non-economic common goals.
These conflicting types of interests in data and
infrastructure exist simultaneously: a hospital might have an
economic interest, for instance a proprietary interest, over a list
of patient names, treatments, and outcomes that one or more of
their employees scrupulously compiled; Barbara, on the other
hand, might have a non-proprietary data privacy interest in the
display or not of her name and information on the list. Both
interests could be said in the abstract to reasonably justify
claims that each the hospital and Barbara might have against
one another. While there may be circumstances where it would
be reasonable for the hospital’s claim to prevail, it seems that
this would hardly be solely on economic or proprietary grounds,
and that there would need to be other good reasons for
overriding Barbara’s interest, e.g. that the health of the nation
depended on the maintenance of such a detailed list of patient
names, treatments and outcomes, or that substantial healthcare
research and innovation were being made possible through such
list.
When it comes to the platform economy, notice and consent
mechanisms are primarily used to allow claims based on
economic interests (a) to prevail over claims based on personality
or privacy interests (b). Collective interests of type (c) are rarely
promoted or clarified through notice and consent. For instance,
by consenting to Uber’s collection and use of our browsing or
geolocation data, we effectively preclude local governments from
being able to access such information on their own terms, forcing
them instead to negotiate with Uber on Uber’s terms for data
valuable to the collectivity. In some ways, therefore, it seems
that by centering the attention on individualistic interests, the
act of consenting in fact leads to the neglect of broader societal
interests of type (c). On the other hand, as a hypothesis,
interests of the non-economic (b) type appear to be protectable
through consent. These include interests in data privacy,
interests in protection against certain forms of personalized
microtargeting, interests against being treated in a
discriminatory or biased way, interests in due process, etc. As
we will see, this hypothesis will prove largely incorrect. None of
these interests can really be protected through notice and
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consent. The interests that consent protects, if any, are the
interests of individuals as consumers to purchase and try new
products, and possibly the interests of individuals as political
and cultural citizens to engage with others in a privately
managed cultural and political public sphere.120
Before turning to an analysis of the individual interests that
arise in the platform economy, three further remarks can be
made on the basis of the example of Barbara and the hospital:
(1) interests in data can vary in importance; (2) as a general
hypothesis, interests of the non-economic (b) type appear to have
greater moral salience than interests of the economic (a) type;
and (3) consent plays an important role in allowing less salient,
or inferior, interests to take priority over allegedly superior ones.
B. Online Interests and Online Harms:
1. Consumer Interests
For the sake of the argument in this Article, it will not be
necessary to engage in an in-depth analysis of the nature and
normative appeal of consumer interests in the context of the
platform economy. It suffices to say that individuals in market
economies such as the United States and the European Union
have an interest in being able to choose amongst a variety of
available products and services as consumers subject to
normative constraints set by fundamental rights, consumer
welfare, and general standards of fairness in market practices.
This also means that in a market economy, consumers’
interests in making autonomous purchasing decisions can be
constrained by normative considerations such as safety,
fairness, or human dignity. Consumers in other words do not
have an interest in being able to opt into or buy consumer
products that have the potential to harm themselves or others.
There are constraints on markets. An example are the very strict
rules around food processing and labelling in both the United
States and Europe, which forbid long distance sales of food that
120. On the meaning of a digital public sphere. See Jack M. Balkin,
Digital Speech and Democratic Culture: a Theory of Freedom of Expression for
the Information Society, 79 N. Y. U. L. REV. 1 (2004); Jack M. Balkin, Fixing
Social Media’s Grand Bargain, Hoover Working Group on Nat’lSec., Tech., and
Law, Aegis Series Paper No. 1814 (Oct. 16, 2018).
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do not comply with certain regional or transnational standards
of safety, origin, labelling, etc. The same is true of products or
services that violate other basic fundamental rights. Consumers
for example should not have the right to purchase products that
are unacceptably manipulative or intrusive on their person or
other persons.
This point will be explored below, but it is important to
understand that the interests of consumers in choosing or
purchasing on a market do not exist in a vacuum and are
constrained by a variety of normative considerations.
2. Privacy
A Western right to privacy enforceable in courts was first
recognized by Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis in a famous
piece in 1890.121 A century later or more, academics and nonacademics alike still debate the contents and contours of privacy
law.
This subsection traces a brief genealogy of our
understanding of privacy as an interest that requires
institutional protection. It traces the debate on privacy from
questioning its very existence to understanding it as control over
a personal sphere, to conceiving it as a more capacious right to a
contextually reasonable flow of information about the self. It
will be argued that a view of privacy as control over the self is
too limited to account for our objective interests in privacy,
which have to do with what others can access and learn about
us. Thus, the boundaries of privacy cannot be managed through
individualized decision-making but must be the fruit of a societal
effort at redefining what fundamental rights mean and what the
limits of markets must be in the 21st century.
a. Privacy Skepticisms
In an article entitled “The Right to Privacy,”122 Judith Jarvis
Thomson famously expressed the view that there can be no
unitary and coherent content to the right to privacy and,
121. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4
HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890).
122. Judith J. Thomson, The Right to Privacy, 4 PHILOSOPHY & PUB.
AFFAIRS 295, 310 (1975).
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therefore, that, as a matter of theory, the right to privacy is an
unhelpful construct. In her view, privacy is a bundle of rights
that intersects with other clusters of rights including the right
to property and rights over the person; any interference which
we understand as a violation of privacy in her view amounts to
a violation of some other right (e.g. the right to exclude others
from one’s body or possessions), or is overridden by other
considerations (freedom of the press, voluntary disclosures of
information to others). The issue with such account of privacy
is that it does not make sense of our intuition that privacy
interests require protections that in certain circumstances go
beyond the protections commonly afforded to property,
reputation, or personal integrity; lending one’s car to a friend
does not necessarily imply that the friend can look into every
corner of the car and read any information left in there by
accident. Thomas Scanlon has addressed this point, arguing
that although there may be no unitary and coherent right to
privacy, there is a unitary and coherent set of interests which
we have in privacy and which require institutional protection.123
Yet even this view of a unitary set of interests in privacy has
been doubted. A number of economists and social scientists have
been busy carrying out experiments showing that our
preferences for privacy are elusive or nonexistent, and do not
seem to match the purported solidity of our preferences for other
market goods. For instance, when privacy comes into conflict
with other values such as the need to share information with
others, Diana Tamir and Jason Mitchell have shown that
disclosure tends to win because it provokes the activation of
neural mechanisms associated with reward, such that humans
are predisposed for self-disclosure.124 Some economists have
shown that privacy preferences are not always reliable,125 yet
others have been able to show that we have interests in placing
limits on other people’s access to information about us. While
individuals at times give up personal data irrationally, they also
123. See Thomas M. Scanlon, Thomson on Privacy, 4 PHILOSOPHY & PUB.
AFFAIRS 315, 315 (1975).
124. Diana I. Tamir & Jason P. Mitchell, Disclosing Information About
the Self is Intrinsically Rewarding, 109 Proceedings of the Nat’l Acad. of Sci. of
the United States of America 8038, 8038 (2012).
125. Susan Athey et al., The Digital Privacy Paradox: Small Money,
Small Costs, Small Talk 1–26 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research Working Paper
No. 234882017), https://perma.cc/9UNW-K9SL.
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at other times display exceptional commitment to shielding their
information from access.126 Once a person has privacy they seem
to want to keep it.127
These findings tell us something about our revealed market
preferences and whether or not we have stable preferences for
privacy, but they do not tell us much about our objective reasons
for valuing privacy, i.e. why we need to place limits on the
extractive, exploitative, and manipulative extension of digital
markets into our lives no matter what we tend to subjectively
prefer or want on these very markets. Without a theory on why
and how to limit the expansion of digital markets, it seems we
are missing an essential component of human life and resigning
to alienation and hopelessness in an increasingly connected,
dataveilled and colonized modern life.
b. Privacy as Control
Because the contours of privacy are difficult to delineate
though patterns of revealed preferences, many have thus
wanted to understand privacy not as a set of stable ‘things’ we
must protect but rather as being about the self-policing of
personal boundaries, or control over a sphere of self-defined
personal autonomy. The idea that privacy is fundamentally
about control is ubiquitous: the journalist Charlie Warzel
defines privacy as being “about how . . . data is used to take away
our control,”128 and tech CEOs like to emphasize “privacy
controls” in their speeches on privacy.129
A number of scholars have provided normative justifications
for the claim that privacy is a right to individually control
personal information. For Alan Westin it is “the claim of
individuals, groups or institutions to determine for themselves
when, how, and to what extent information about them is

126. Acquisti et al., supra note 57, at 510.
127. Alessandro Acquisti et al., What Is Privacy Worth?, 42 J. LEGAL STUD.
249, 264 (2013).
128. Charlie Warzel, Privacy Is Too Big to Understand, N.Y. TIMES (Apr.
18, 2019), https://perma.cc/5MMG-5HH8.
129. Josh Constine, Zuckerberg Says Facebook Will Offer GDPR Privacy
Controls
Everywhere,
TECHCRUNCH
(Apr.
4,
2018),
https://techcrunch.com/2018/04/04/zuckerberg-gdpr/.
See
also
Privacy
Controls, GOOGLE, https://perma.cc/94KW-YFVU.
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communicated to others,”130 Jerry Kang defines it as “an
individual’s control over the processing – i.e., the acquisition,
disclosure, and use – of personal information.”131 Proprietary
understandings of data are also strongly correlated to notions of
control over information.132 Charles Fried’s account of the
foundations of privacy illustrates the general understanding of
privacy as a form of control.133 Fried rejects instrumental
arguments such as Thomson’s that privacy is only a means to
protect some other values, and instead advances a positive
Kantian view of the right to privacy: to make most human
relationships of respect, love, friendship, and trust meaningful
we need to make space for an interest in privacy. He states that:
As a first approximation, privacy seems to be
related to secrecy, to limiting the knowledge of
others about oneself. This notion must be refined.
It is not true, for instance, that the less that is
known about us the more privacy we have.
Privacy is not simply an absence of information
about us in the minds of others; rather it is the
control we have over information about
ourselves.134
Centrally, the emphasis on control is premised on a faith in
individual decision-making as the default means for governing
personal information. Where Fried’s view starts to break down
is in contexts where individuals can hardly be understood as
good decision-makers. In those circumstances, which are exactly
the circumstances that this Article explores, we need to look for
a different way to understand how the extension of markets into
private life should be limited.
130. ALAN F. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 7 (1967).
131. JerryKang, Information Privacy in Cyberspace Transactions, 50
STAN. L. REV 1193, 1203 (1998).
132. See, e.g., Paul M. Schwartz, Property, Privacy, and Personal Data, 17
HARV. L. REV 2055, 2057 (2004); Lauren H. Scholz, Privacy as Quasi-Property,
101 IOWA L. REV. 1113 (2016); Jeff Sovern, Opting in, Opting out, or No Options
at All: The Fight for Control of Personal Information, 74 WASH. L. REV. 1033
(1999).
133. Charles Fried, Privacy: A Moral Analysis, 77 YALE L. J. 475, 482
(1968).
134. Id. at 482.
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c. Beyond Control
When it comes to the digital economy, pervasive behavioral
manipulability, enclosure, and conditioning of individuals have
led more than one scholar to argue against an understanding of
privacy as control.
In her work, Julie Cohen shows that accounts based on
individual control and consent are theoretically misleading.135
One of her arguments is that grounding privacy on rational
decision-making, autonomy, and dignity prioritizes some forms
of autonomy, generally individual-centric interests in receiving
information, over other autonomy interests, such as the interest
in engaging and coexisting with others. She points out that
these autonomy-based accounts rarely show us how to
adjudicate conflicts between different sets of autonomy
interests. As she puts it, “[i]nterrogating the conceptions of
autonomy that exist in privacy theory exposes a deep conceptual
poverty about what selves are made of.”136
Helen Nissenbaum’s view of privacy as contextual integrity
also goes beyond individualized preferences and control over the
self.137 She argues that visions of privacy as control fail to
account for the fact that privacy is not only about self-policing
but also about how others access and experience information
about us. She envisions privacy as a right over a contextually
appropriate flow of information, understood by reference to the
notion of contextual integrity, which is a method for evaluating
the appropriateness of existing informational norms in context.
Informational norms, according to Nissenbaum, vary depending
on the people between whom information flows, the types of
information being shared and the normative principles
governing the transmission of any given information.138 By
applying a contextual approach to privacy, Nissenbaum is able
to depart from control and to adopt a more holistic perspective
135. See generally JULIE E. COHEN, CONFIGURING THE NETWORKED SELF:
LAW, CODE AND THE PLAY OF EVERYDAY PRACTICE (2012), ch.5 [hereinafter
NETWORKED SELF].
136. Id. at 114.
137. See generally HELEN NISSENBAUM, PRIVACY IN CONTEXT:
TECHNOLOGY, POLICY, AND THE INTEGRITY OF SOCIAL LIFE (2010).
138. Id. at 140.
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on information governance.
More broadly, what scholars such as Cohen, Nissenbaum or
Shoshana Zuboff see as central to a normative understanding of
privacy today is the need to limit the advancement of digital
markets and the focus on economic efficiency in order to
safeguard, protect, and honor human life in a commodified
environment. Rather than focusing on the empirical stability of
our privacy preferences, or on the philosophical coherence of our
privacy interests, we ought to focus on the reasonable limits that
should be placed on extractive commercial incentives’ ability to
erode spaces for the self.
3. Interests in Enjoying the Benefits of the Informational
Public Sphere without Suffering Manipulation,
Microtargeting and other Algorithmic Harms
Looking beyond the contested notion of privacy, we seem to
have an interest in enjoying the benefits of the informational
economy without suffering objectionable forms of manipulation
and other harms such as algorithmic bias, discrimination,
polarization, and lack of due process. While we might want to
understand notice and consent as being aligned with our interest
in accessing online content, blank access to content, without
protection from manipulation and other online harms, does not
seem tolerable. Insofar as notice and consent purports to allow
us to access platforms without protecting us from these harms,
its operation does not seem to align with our interests.
a. Access to the Informational Public Sphere
We have an interest, as members of social communities, in
exchanging information, imparting, and being imparted
information. We have reasons, for instance, to access content on
Facebook, YouTube, Twitter, or Google Search, in participating
in discussions and making personal content available on these
platforms.
One philosophical justification for this interest can be found
in John Stuart Mill’s notorious utilitarian defense of speech and
freedom of conscience, that our ability to speak and develop
thoughts without constraints is deeply connected to our
individuality, and that suppressing speech and the ability to
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exchange information risks propelling us into tyranny.139 One
could think this means that we need unrestrained access to as
much content and opportunities for exchange as possible and
that notice and consent practices’ limited interference with the
ability of individuals to access platform content offers the ideal
means of promoting our interest in accessing and participating
in the informational public sphere. Consent as an enabler of
permissionless speech in other words seems to align with Mill’s
vision of a liberal society.
A Millian rationale for minimizing constraints on imparting
and being imparted information rests on at least two false
assumptions, however. The first assumption is an unreasonable
faith in the self-regulating free flow of opinions, or “marketplace
of ideas,”140 i.e. the fact that opinions that are misleading or false
can be corrected by allowing unrestrained flows of counterspeech to progressively displace them. This might have been
empirically true in 1859 or in the 1920s when speech used to be
channeled in a top-down manner through a limited number of
closely controlled bottlenecks and when the main concern was to
ensure that the information that reached individuals would
remain as diverse as possible. This is certainly no longer true in
the platform economy, where the oversupply of ideas seems to be
saturating the marketplace leading to purported ‘market
failures.’141 Flows of counter-speech today are in fact leading to
greater polarization and conspiracies, rather than a healthy and
pluralistic informational public sphere.142 Therefore, we may
need to place constraints on users’ terms of access and
139. See generally JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY (1859).
140. See, e.g., Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting); Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J.,
concurring).
141. See Stanley Ingber, The Marketplace of Ideas: A Legitimizing Myth,
1 Duke L.J. (1984) (discussing the notion of a failure of the marketplace of
ideas); see also C. Edwin. Baker, 8 CONST. COMMENT. 164 (1989) (book review).
Oreste Pollicino has been discussing the notion of market failures in relation
to the issue of “fake news.” See Oreste Pollicino, Editorial, Fake News, Internet
and Metaphors (to be handled carefully), 9 ITALIAN J. PUB. L. (2017).
142. See, e.g., CASS R. SUNSTEIN, #REPUBLIC: DIVIDED DEMOCRACY IN THE
AGE OF SOCIAL MEDIA (2017); YOCHAI BENKLER ET AL., NETWORK PROPAGANDA:
MANIPULATION, DISINFORMATION, AND RADICALIZATION IN AMERICAN POLITICS
(2018); Claudio Lombardi, The Illusion of a “Marketplace of Ideas” and the
Right to Truth, AMERICAN AFFAIRS J., Vol III (Spring 2019),
https://americanaffairsjournal.org/2019/02/the-illusion-of-a-marketplace-ofideas-and-the-right-to-truth/ (last visited Nov. 25, 2019).
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participation that go beyond individual consent.
The second related assumption is that speech can best be
protected if the individual is recognized as the sole and ultimate
source of authority regarding how and what information can be
shared on the marketplace of ideas. Platforms are constantly
designing and manipulating the kinds of speech that is shared
and accessed online, through design nudges and the intervention
of their employees, reviewers, and algorithms.143
The
information we access is always mediated by others, who have
their own purposes and manipulative intentions.144
The
likelihood that individuals will be manipulated when accessing
a platform is indeed very high. It is not factually accurate to
understand individuals as the ultimate decision-makers
regarding content flowing online.
Richard Strauss argues that we must understand the
interest in imparting and being imparted information as
grounded in a Kantian principle of autonomy that individuals
have a right to communicate and cultivate themselves as ends
in themselves and never as means.145 By allowing individuals to
be manipulated on digital platforms, we in fact allow others, e.g.
Facebook or political propagandists, to treat these individuals as
means instead of ends and to hinder their ability to determine
their own life plans. Thus, we must enable speech and
information exchange on platforms in a permissive way only to
the extent permissionless exchange aligns with the imperative
of respecting persons as ends and never to instrumentalize or
manipulate them.
Even if we were to reject Strauss’ Kantian principle of
autonomy as a persuasive understanding of our reasons to
access and share information in digital settings, we can infer
from this discussion that we retain an interest in being shielded
from certain forms of manipulation, coercion, and harm in spite
143. Kate Klonick, The New Governors: The People, Rules, and Processes
Governing Online Speech, 131 HARV. L. REV. 598 (2018); see also TARLETON
GILLESPIE, CUSTODIANS OF THE INTERNET: PLATFORMS, CONTENT MODERATION,
AND THE HIDDEN DECISIONS THAT SHAPE SOCIAL MEDIA (2018); Anupam Chander
and Vivek Krishnamurthy, The Myth of the Neutral Platform, 2 GEO. L. TECH.
REV. 400 (2018).
144. NICK COULDRY & ANDREAS HEPP, THE MEDIATED CONSTRUCTION OF
REALITY (2016).
145. David Strauss, Persuasion, Autonomy, and Freedom of Expression,
91 COLUM. L. REV. 334 (1991).
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of our interest in accessing platforms. Consent cannot advance
our interest in benefiting from the informational public sphere
to the extent it subjects us to these risks.
b. Manipulation
What forms of coercion and manipulation do we have an
interest in being shielded against?
It seems that any understanding of manipulation on
platforms must take into account the following dimensions of
digital life: (1) technology makes the storage and display of our
vulnerabilities in the form of digital traces not only possible but
also relentless and permanent, (2) information asymmetries and
partial information are pervasive, (3) our digital choices are
distorted by design constraints so that we are not always or ever
fully in control of our online decisions and their consequences,
(4) lock-in mechanisms psychologically enclose us right after
access constraining our ability and willingness to look for
outside options, and (5) most if not all of our online choices
impose costs on unaware third parties.
Tal Zarsky has emphasized the importance of manipulation
for understanding digital harms today.146
He defines
manipulation broadly, as influence that is unfair or
unacceptable, and he considers data-driven manipulation as
substantially different from all previous forms of manipulation
because it is hidden, personalized, and ubiquitous.147 Daniel
Susser, Beate Roessler, and Helen Nissenbaum have similarly
argued that manipulation is particularly salient in digital
environments.148 Manipulation to them is a deliberate hidden
influence, and manipulating is the act of “intentionally and
covertly influencing decision-making, by targeting and exploiting
decision-making vulnerabilities.”149
This phenomenon is
146. Tal Zarsky, Privacy and Manipulation in the Digital Age, 20.1
THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 157 (2019).
147. See Karen Yeung, Hypernudge: Big Data as a Mode of Regulation by
Design, 20 INFO. COMM. & SOC’Y 118 (2017) (discussing data-driven influence
and data exceptionalism).
148. Susser et al., infra note 149; see also Daniel Susser et al., Online
Manipulation: Hidden Influences in a Digital World, 3 GEO. L. TECH. REV.
(forthcoming 2019).
149. Daniel Susser, Beate Roessler & Helen Nissenbaum, Technology,
Autonomy, and Manipulation, 8 INTERNET POL’Y REV. 1, 4 (2019).

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol40/iss1/7

52

362

PACE LAW REVIEW

40.1

particularly prevalent in the platform economy.
The focus of both these accounts on deliberate covert acts
that are personalized and target vulnerabilities seems to
capture part of what makes certain actions objectionable in the
digital context; their covertness does not afford us an
opportunity to understand the impacts they have on us, and to
shape our lives accordingly. In Stanley Benn’s view,150 which
aligns with Richard Strauss’ above,151 when platforms
deliberately manipulate us and use information about us in
ways that we cannot fully understand, they impair our very
understanding of ourselves and of the context that surrounds us,
denying us respect as persons. As Benn puts it, “to respect
someone as a person is to concede that one ought to take account
of the way in which his enterprise might be affected by one’s own
decisions.”152 Further, “[o]ne cannot be said to respect a man . . .
if one knowingly and deliberately alters his conditions of action,
concealing the fact from him.”153 What makes manipulative
interferences particularly objectionable in the platform context
is that these interferences instrumentalize us for profit or other
selfish motives, impairing our ability to shape our existence in
accordance with our own plans, and thereby fail to afford us the
respect we are owed as persons.
To the extent manipulation is covert, can consent and
disclosures solve it? A move to transparent disclosure, assuming
it is feasible, risks boosting even more opaque manipulative
techniques. Julie Cohen notes that, as notice and consent
became established in the United States as the dominant device
for regulating corporate digital tracking techniques this
practically incentivized “the quest to track internet users by less
transparent means . . . pushing ever more deeply into the logical
and hardware layers of consumers’ devices.”154
To tackle manipulation and microtargeting on online
platforms, therefore, we need to first look beyond terms and
conditions and disclosures at how power and money are
150. Stanley I. Benn, Privacy, Freedom and Respect for Persons, in
FERDINAND D. SCHOEMAN (ED.), PHILOSOPHICAL DIMENSIONS OF PRIVACY (1984).
151. Strauss, supra note 145.
152. Benn, supra note 150, at 229.
153. Id. at 230.
154. JULIE E. COHEN, BETWEEN TRUTH AND POWER 56–57 (2019)
[hereinafter TRUTH AND POWER].
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channeled through existing infrastructure and data and then to
open-up and regulate those bottlenecks. One such bottleneck is
indeed the idealized and seamless practice of notice and consent.
Other bottlenecks include data collection and profiling practices,
ad-based business models, information-sorting algorithms, and
the exploitative reliance on temporary contractors at scale.
c. Bias, Discrimination, Lack of Due Process
In parallel, and still beyond privacy, many scholars have
uncovered and described a multitude of other hidden harms that
result from the deployment of opaque automated algorithms at
scale.155 When one clicks that they have read and understand
Google or Facebook’s terms of service, one is in fact accepting
these diffuse harms.
Mittelstadt et al. identify at least seven concerns with the
use of machine learning algorithms, including as deployed by
platforms such as Google or Facebook.156 These include concerns
about the biased and unfair nature of the outcomes of machine
learning systems, which relate to how machine learning systems
operate, but also to the training and input data used and the
broader context within which machine learning is deployed;
concerns with the “transformative effects” of machine learning
systems such as effects on how we experience the political
system and the world as mediated through these systems; and
epistemological concerns relating to the evidence produced
through machine learning systems including lack of
explainability and interpretability of algorithms. Other harms
155. See
Danielle
Keats
Citron, Technological
Due
Process,
85 WASH. U. L. REV. 1249, 1314 (2008); Citron & Pasquale, infra note 159;
Jane Bambauer & Tal Zarsky, The Algorithm Game, 94 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1
(2018); Brent Daniel Mittelstadt et al., The Ethics of Algorithms: Mapping the
Debate, 3 BIG DATA & SOC’Y. (2016); Lilian Edwards & Michael Veale, Slave to
the Algorithm: Why a Right to an Explanation is Probably Not the Remedy You
Are Looking For, 16 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 18 (2017); Sandra Wachter & Brent
Mittelstadt, A Right to Reasonable Inferences: Re-Thinking Data Protection in
the Age of Big Data and AI, COLUM. BUS. L. REV., (forthcoming 2019); Frederike
Kaltheuner & Elettra Bietti, Data Is Power: Towards Additional Guidance on
Profiling and Automated Decision-Making in the GDPR, 2 J. OF INF. RTS, POL’Y.
& PRAC. (2018); Reuben Binns, Fairness in Machine Learning: Lessons from
Political Philosophy, 81 J. MACHINE LEARNING RES. (2018).
156. Brent Daniel Mittelstadt et al., The Ethics of Algorithms: Mapping
the Debate, 3 BIG DATA & SOC’Y. (2016).
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include chilling effects on speech, filter bubbles and
polarization.157
Danielle Citron and Frank Pasquale’s work on technological
due process describes algorithmic decision-making as entailing
a variety of risks, including a very high tendency to perpetuate
pre-existing inequalities and implicit biases through their
opacity, arbitrary application, and disparate impacts:158
“[s]coring systems can have a powerful allure – their simplicity
gives the illusion of precision and reliability. But predictive
algorithms can be anything but accurate and fair. They can
narrow people’s life opportunities in arbitrary and
discriminatory ways.”159 These harms in turn have prompted
inquiries into novel forms of due process in opaque digital
environments where individuals are unable to foresee the
harms.
Karen Yeung considers some of the novel threats posed by
big data and algorithms through the lens of the “hypernudge.”160
Algorithms operate through a recursive feedback loop that
extends in three directions: constant refinement of the choice
environment, constant data feedback to the choice architect, and
constant comparison of the individual’s choice environment to
wider population trends. In so doing, these systems also
inherently shape our cognitive environment within platforms,
nudging us toward pre-designed choices and decisions.161
Tufekci similarly provides an account of platform-related
algorithmic harms dividing them into two broad groups:162

157. See, e.g., Kaltheuner & Bietti, supra note 155, at 2; Opinion of the
European Data Protection Supervisor (Mar. 19, 2018), https://perma.cc/85MPR5VA.
158. Danielle
Keats
Citron, Technological
Due
Process,
85 WASH. U.L. REV. 1249 (2008); Citron & Pasquale, infra note 159.
159. Danielle Keats Citron & Frank Pasquale, The Scored Society: Due
Process for Automated Predictions, 89 WASH. L. REV. 1, 33 (2014).
160. Karen Yeung, ‘Hypernudge’: Big Data as a Mode of Regulation by
Design, 20 INFO., COMM. & SOC’Y. 118 (2016).
161. Karen Yeung shows that like any other regulatory design
mechanism, algorithms possess three “cybernetic” features: information
gathering and monitoring, standard-setting, and behavior modification. See
CHRISTOPHER HOOD, HENRY ROTHSTEIN & ROBERT BALDWIN, THE GOVERNMENT
OF RISK: UNDERSTANDING RISK REGULATION REGIMES (2001).
162. See Zeynep Tufekci, Algorithmic Harms Beyond Facebook and
Google: Emergent Challenges of Computational Agency, 13 COLO. TECH. L. J.
203 (2015).
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concerns with lack of visibility, information asymmetries and
hidden influences on the one hand and concerns with inferences
and profiling on the other. Many of these harms overlap closely
with manipulative harms and respect for persons, as discussed.
C. Conclusions to Part III
Overall, it seems that when an individual clicks and accepts
certain terms and conditions and consents to a platform’s
privacy policy, they are in fact agreeing to a number of hidden
forms of intrusive and manipulative data collection, use and
storage practices, interferences, and opaque treatments. As a
result, it may lead to various harms to oneself and to others,
including losses of respect and dignity, discriminatory impacts,
and other systemic effects connected to commodification and the
erosion of spaces for the self. In these circumstances, we must
seriously question whether the emphasis on individualized
notice and consent as a device which enables access and choice
is appropriate and whether even the most extensive disclosure
and the most freely given consent is actually sufficient to protect
us from diffuse and systemic harms in the platform economy.
As said in Part I of this Article, consent’s magic is that it can
transform the relationship between two or more people and
change the justifications each of them, as well as external
observers, have for their respective behaviors. In the platform
context, this hardly seems the case. It certainly seems to
legitimate companies’ practices, but hardly empowers
individuals to make real choices in the platform economy on how
to structure their relationship with these companies. The gap
between what we have reason to want and what we seem to
actually prefer in the platform economy, between what we get
and what platforms get, points to an underlying power struggle.
It is in the context of this power struggle, therefore, that notice
and consent mechanisms have acquired a special importance, as
a solution that appears to make practical sense on its face and
that in fact acts as a free pass that promotes the political and
economic interests of large data conglomerates. By accepting
the terms and conditions, individuals pursue their consumer
preferences and are given the right to access platform content at
the cost of giving up on fundamental human interests in being
treated with respect, not being discriminated and manipulated,
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and not being subjected to covert harms that they cannot
properly be warned of. Although some might consider these
harms tolerable, the next section explains why they cannot be
deemed tolerable to everyone.
IV. The Mirage of Transformation
We said that consent’s transformative moral force requires
the embodiment of at least three things: (a) the possibility of
free, autonomous consent given under just background
conditions; (b) the interests, rights, and states of affairs
purportedly being transformed, can actually be transformed by
the consent; and (c) the consent does not unreasonably harm
third parties. Having articulated some of the things we might
want to see protected in the platform economy, it seems that
most of these things are not of a kind that can be alienated or
transformed, and that some are diffuse and collective in kind,
meaning that their disposal through individualized notice and
consent can significantly harm third parties. Respect, dignity,
and non-discrimination are arguably so essential that they give
rise to thick institutional protection in the form of inalienable
rights. Other interests, such as those in having a say over how
data is collected and used or in preventing extensive
commodification and datafication are collective concerns that
might not be strictly inalienable but require collective
governance solutions. This section examines the collective
dimensions and the inalienable interests that notice and consent
purportedly transform, showing that consent lacks morally
transformative force in relation to these concerns and simply
acts as a performative façade that normalizes the platform
economy.
A. Collective Goods and Collective Governance
An important reason for doubting the transformative force
of notice and consent in the platform economy is that the erosion
of privacy, the commodification of personal data, and the
increasing colonization by markets of spaces for the self all seem
to be affecting people collectively, by on the one hand creating
isolation, personalization, and the loss of a sense of community
and on the other hand maintaining artificial interpersonal
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connections through opaque data patterns. A concern is that
managing data in an individualized way, through notice and
consent, only increases these problems, accentuating isolation
and the fragmented management of diffuse harms.163 More
concretely, data can be about a variety of individuals at once,
and the consent of some may result in consequences that affect
others. This issue arose as part of the Cambridge Analytica
scandal:164 when individuals agreed to use Kogan’s quiz app and
letting the app access their personal information, they also
agreed to the app’s access to personal information about their
friends whose Facebook settings allowed it. This is what Maggie
Koerth-Baker called the “privacy of the commons”165 problem,
defining it as:
what happens when one person’s voluntary
disclosure of personal information exposes the
personal information of others who had no say in
the matter. Your choices didn’t cause the breach.
Your choices can’t prevent it, either. Welcome to a
world where you can’t opt out of sharing, even if
you didn’t opt in.166
It has also long become apparent that the more personal
data a business can link together through network effects, the
more the usefulness of any datapoint within that network
increases. Google search is a good example of a service whose
quality increases for searchers in proportion of the data Google
accumulates about other people’s searches. This also means
companies have an incentive to abuse the collective dimensions
163. See Julie E. Cohen, Turning Privacy Inside Out, 20 THEORETICAL
INQUIRIES L. 1 (2019); Barocas & Nissenbaum, supra note 11; see also Julie E.
Cohen, What Privacy is For, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1904 (2013); NETWORKED SELF,
supra note 135.
164. Nadeem Badshah, Facebook to Contact 87 Million Users Affected by
Data
Breach,
THE
GUARDIAN
(Apr.
8,
2018),
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2018/apr/08/facebook-to-contact-the87-million-users-affected-by-data-breach.
165. See infra note 166; see also Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the
Commons,
162
SCIENCE
1243
(1968),
https://science.sciencemag.org/content/sci/162/3859/1243.full.pdf.
166. Maggie Koerth, You Can’t Opt Out Of Sharing Your Data, Even If
You Didn’t Opt In, FIFTHYTHIRTYEIGHT (May 3, 2018), https://perma.cc/7UNW2WBJ.
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of data by letting each user generate information about others.
The collective nature of privacy and data harms points in
the direction of collective mechanisms for managing data
instead of individualized notice and consent. Framing data as a
commons owned by communities of people, and developing
initiatives such as data cooperatives, trusts and collective
management schemes give us reason to hope.167 However, the
devil in these cases is in the details: Are these initiatives giving
power to people to change current incentives and commercial
structures? Do they lead to a mere redistribution of value from
the top or do they create opportunities to re-frame our
understanding of value?
1. Liberal Rights and Collective Governance
The collective nature of privacy harms is a very powerful
reason for rethinking the centrality of notice and consent,
resisting an understanding of privacy as control over data, and
looking to collective management solutions. However, when it
comes to minimizing data collection and limiting excessive
intrusions or commodification of data, there are good reasons to
keep taking rights seriously. The primary reason for this is that
some understandings of collective self-management do not
account for the value of certain fundamental interests of
persons, such as the interest in dignity and in being respected
as a person and not manipulated, commodified, or harmed for
profit. Data collectives can indeed function as a coherent
community while having as their primary purpose the
monetization and exploitation of collective data. While this may
seem individually acceptable to some, allowing the data of a
group to be exploited for profit can mean denying dignity and
respect to members of that group including some who willingly
accepted it and others. Another way of putting it is to say that
if Facebook were to become a collective, or if a collective were to
engage in the same data intrusive practices as Facebook during
the Cambridge Analytica episode, a collective would not
eliminate the disvalue of those activities for the group and its
167. See, e.g., MARIANA MAZZUCATO, THE VALUE OF EVERYTHING: MAKING
AND TAKING IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY (2018); Benedetto Vecchi, I Dati Sono un
Bene Comune e Appartengono ai Cittadini, IL MANIFESTO(Nov. 6, 2019); Dᴇᴄᴏᴅᴇ
Pʀᴏᴊᴇᴄᴛ, https://decodeproject.eu/ (last visited Nᴏᴠ. 25, 2019).
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single members. Group membership does not prevent practices
that violate certain inalienable rights of persons.
Liberal theorists such as Joseph Raz, Thomas Scanlon, John
Rawls, and others have developed nuanced understandings of
the relationship between individual entitlements and the
collective good.168 Each of them has argued that taking
individual rights seriously does not entail an abdication of
collective values, and, factually speaking, in most circumstances
the collective good overrides individualist pursuits.169 Raz
understands morality as primarily non-individualistic and nonrights-based but still recognizes the important role that rights
play in protecting the fundamental value of each person.
Focusing on “interests” as a basis for rights allows him to make
sense of the fact that some interests do not bear only on
individuals but also on groups and that only a subset of these
interests require individual rights protection. Some interests
can be valued and vindicated through means such as collective
organizing. Rights can also have a collective dimension, socioeconomic rights are an example.170
B. Inalienable Rights
Another important reason for resisting consent is that some
of the interests that it purportedly allows us to pursue, or the
rights it purportedly allows us to transform, are constitutive of
our person and thus inalienable; they are so fundamental to who
we are that they cannot be disposed of through acts of the will.
It is useful to explain why we have inalienable rights not to be
manipulated or harmed in the platform context. The following
clarifies the debate on inalienability by articulating what it
means to have an inalienable right, relying on the example of
our inalienable right against manipulative intrusions.

168. See RAZ, supra note 21, at 163; see also THOMAS SCANLON, WHAT WE
OWE TO EACH OTHER (1998).
169. An example is John Rawls’ difference principle, which posits that
welfare increases, to be justified, must benefit the least advantaged at least as
much if not more than the more advantaged. See Samuel Freeman, Illiberal
Libertarians: Why Libertarianism Is Not a Liberal View, 30 PHIL. & PUB. AFF.
105 (2001).
170. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,
Dec. 16 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3.
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1. Controversies over Alienability
Privacy as a basic fundamental right is guaranteed in equal
measure to all under several state constitutions and
international charters.171 The text of the California State
Constitution even stipulates that “[a]ll people are by their nature
free and independent and have inalienable rights. Among these
are enjoying and defending life and liberty, acquiring,
possessing, and protecting property, and pursuing and obtaining
safety, happiness and privacy.”172 Values such as personal
integrity,173 human dignity, and self-determination174 have also
been considered inalienable.175
A right is inalienable if it is so basic as to constitute what it
means to be a human. For Immanuel Kant, the inalienability of
rights is required to ensure that each person maintains their
equal status as persons with equal dignity: one cannot give up
one’s capacity for freedom because giving away freedom means
giving away humanity.176 John Stuart Mill also recognizes
limits to our capacity to trade away aspects of our freedom
irreversibly; one cannot enslave oneself, for example, because it
would mean giving up being a free person for good.177
Inalienability in other words is what ensures that people are
treated as humans with equal basic rights instead of as means,

171. See, e.g., Universal Declaration of Human Rights art. 12, Dec. 10,
1948; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 17, Dec. 16,
1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171; European Convention on Human Rights art 8, Nov. 4,
1950.
172. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 1.
173. See Helen Nissenbaum’s account of privacy as contextual integrity.
NISSENBAUM, supra note 137.
174. See Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVᴇʀꜰGE][ Federal Constitutional
Court] October 18-19, 1983, 65 BVᴇʀꜰGE 1 (Ger.). See also IMMANUEL KANT,
FOUNDATIONS OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS (1785) (discussing the
philosophical notions of dignity and self-determination).
175. Samuel Freeman, Illiberal Libertarians: Why Libertarianism Is Not
a Liberal View, 30 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 105 (2001); see also Conseil d’Etat, supra
note 34.
176. IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICAL ELEMENTS OF JUSTICE 98 (John
Ladd trans., New York Library of Liberal Arts, 1965) (1797).
177. MILL, supra note 139, ch. 5. See also BRIAN BARRY, CULTURE AND
EQUALITY 148 (2001), in relation to the right of exit inherent in the freedom to
associate; Hallie Liberto, The Problem with Sexual Promises, 127 ETHICS
(2017) (discussing the withdrawal of sexual promises).
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slaves, or property.178
When it comes to data and privacy, inalienability has been
doubted or defined narrowly.179 One possible reason is that
there is serious disagreement over whether trading away one’s
data or giving up aspects of one’s privacy entails losing core
aspects of freedom or well-being. Part of the disagreement is due
to the fact that we currently live our lives in an environment
that already commodifies us for various commercial purposes.
The question that divides us then is whether or not such
commodification is objectionable and denies us essential privacy
protections. It is argued here that it does, and that a compelling
understanding of privacy requires an account of what it means
for aspects of our privacy to be inalienable.

2. The Right against Manipulative Intrusions
Thomas Scanlon, like Joseph Raz, offers an interest-based
theory of rights which both clarifies the relationship between
interests and rights and helps uncover what the inalienable core
of our online rights might be about.180 As said in Part III,
interests are what people value and care about, not what they
selfishly or subjectively want but what they objectively have
reason to value. Scanlon defines rights as “constraints on
discretion to act that we believe [are] important means for
avoiding morally unacceptable consequences.”181 To claim a
right violation for Scanlon means to claim three things: (1) that
a discretionary course of action by private or institutional actors
leads to unacceptable consequences, (2) that constraints over
such discretion are possible, and (3) that said course of action in
fact violates such constraints.182 Scanlon believes a right has
three essential components: (1) an ends, i.e. interests, harms,

178. Freeman, supra note 169, at 113.
179. See, e.g., Václav Janeček & Gianclaudio Malgieri, Data Extra
Commercium, DATA AS COUNTER-PERFORMANCE – CONTRACT LAW 2.0?
(forthcoming 2019); Aᴅᴀᴍ D. Mᴏᴏʀᴇ, Pʀɪᴠᴀᴄʏ, Iɴᴛᴇʀᴇꜱᴛꜱ, ᴀɴᴅ Iɴᴀʟɪᴇɴᴀʙʟᴇ Rɪɢʜᴛꜱ
(2018).
180. Tʜᴏᴍᴀꜱ M. Sᴄᴀɴʟᴏɴ, Content Regulation Reconsidered, in THE
DIFFICULTY OF TOLERANCE: ESSAYS IN POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 151 (2003).
181. Id. at 151.
182. Id. at 152.
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goals or values that makes us consider given consequences as
unacceptable and given constraints as justified (e.g. the interest
in privacy, the interest in the prevention of manipulative
interferences); (2) a means, i.e. constraints the right is said to
involve in order to protect the ends (e.g. notice and consent, data
minimization requirements, access to judicial enforcement); and
(3) a link between empirical beliefs as to possible unacceptable
consequences and beliefs as to consequences of the constraints
the right proposes. Thus, for Scanlon determining the existence
and boundaries of a right is an exercise in reflective
equilibrium183 which must be grounded in a preliminary inquiry
into the interests we have in constraining unreasonable actions
that interfere with these interests. Given the significant
empirical component of rights, Scanlon recognizes that the
determination of rights necessarily entails a degree of “creative
instability” and that rights have a protean, dynamic existence
that can never be fully captured.
a. The Ends:
Intrusions

Protection

against

Manipulative

This subsection shows that data privacy is coextensive with
protection from data-driven manipulative practices online, and
explains what these interests are about and why they are
inalienable.
In an early piece, Scanlon developed an understanding of
the right to privacy, linking our interests in privacy to
enforceable constraints on the power to interfere with such
interests.184 Scanlon presents his views on privacy in response
to Thomson’s critique of the right to privacy outlined above, yet
he does not go far beyond arguing that the unitary nature of
privacy can be found in a set of special interests we have in being
able to be free from certain kinds of intrusions.185 Such interests
include specific interests in not being seen, overheard, etc., and
also broader interests in having a conventionally defined “zone
of privacy in which we can carry out our activities without the
necessity of being continually alert for possible observers,
183. RAWLS, supra note 32, at 42–45.
184. See Scanlon, supra note 123; See Thomson, supra note 122.
185. Thomson, supra note 122.
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listeners, etc.” Scanlon emphasizes the importance of convention
to define “a zone of privacy immune from specified interventions.”
He also notes that technological advances may require us to
extend old conventions or to change them in the face of a new
situation.186
There is something intuitively appealing in the idea that
privacy’s unitary nature can be found in the need to be protected
against certain kinds of intrusions and interferences, and that
any potential “zone of privacy” must be defined and understood
within a given social context. Yet this must be qualified in two
ways. First, we must tread carefully when speaking of “zones” of
privacy in order not to obscure the diffuse and invisible nature
of privacy violations and manipulative interferences in the
platform economy. It is helpful for example to expand our
understanding of privacy beyond spatiality by considering Helen
Nissenbaum’s theory of privacy as claims to appropriate flows of
information about oneself,187 or Mireille Hildebrandt’s
understanding of privacy as the freedom from unreasonable
constraints on the construction of one’s identity.188
Second, we need a criterion for distinguishing what is
within the zone of reasonable privacy protection from what is
outside of it. While Nissenbaum relies on the notion of
“contextual integrity,” her theory does not distinguish, other
than on a case-by-case basis, between aspects of privacy that we
can give up consensually and aspects of privacy that we ought
not to be able to give up at all, i.e. alienable and inalienable
aspects of privacy. Stanley Benn instead provides a normative
criterion for this distinction which seems useful here.189 His
account grounds privacy in a Kantian understanding of respect
for persons, i.e. the need to ensure that persons are treated as
ends in themselves and never instrumentalized for the pursuit
of someone else’s aims. As seen, respect in the Kantian sense
means treating a person as an end and allowing that person to
choose her own ends. In the platform economy, respect means
ensuring that each person is physically and mentally enabled to
pursue a life of their own through a sufficient level of self186. See THOMAS M. SCANLON, WHAT WE OWE TO EACH OTHER 204 (1998).
187. NISSENBAUM, supra note 137.
188. See MIREILLE HILDEBRANDT, SMART TECHNOLOGIES AND THE END(S) OF
LAW (2015).
189. Benn, supra note 150.

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol40/iss1/7

64

374

PACE LAW REVIEW

40.1

awareness and understanding of their environment, sufficient
space for independent thinking, etc. Thus ensuring that a
person can flourish and make independent decisions about their
life.
Data privacy seems, therefore, to be coextensive with
protections against manipulative intrusions based on personal
data, such as microtargeting or other behavior that undermines
dignity and the capacity for self-awareness. Data surveillance
and related manipulation should not be capable of being
consented or opted into, to the extent they remain covert and
blur the ability of individuals to make decisions regarding who
they want to be, how they should vote, purchase, and more
broadly how they want to conduct their lives. Protection against
forms of interference that instrumentalize human life should
prevail over a person’s initial choice as a consumer to access a
platform’s gated services not knowing what might come next.
An even bolder line of argument on inalienability consists in
saying that most if not all forms of data commodification lead to
objectionable discriminatory treatment of persons, and that
because such treatment is intolerable, no person should be
allowed to accept it. A particularly salient case here is the way
markets over data seem to incentivize people in need to give up
their privacy while others maintain higher levels of protection,
thus advantaging the rich.190 The resulting inequalities and the
surreptitious discriminatory treatment that might result from
them in digital environments are important reasons for treating
privacy and protection from manipulative intrusions as largely
inalienable and as needing to be advanced in equal measure for
all.
b. The Means: Beyond Notice and Consent
Having identified these special interests, the next step
consists in asking how to design constraints that can prevent
interferences with them. This question can be taken at varying
levels of abstraction but is fundamentally about which
institutions can ensure protection of given interests and how. As
importantly emphasized by Julie Cohen, when thinking about
190. See generally KHIARA M. BRIDGES, THE POVERTY
(2017).
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how to protect our privacy, we must be aware that our
understanding of it is in large part shaped by the universe of
possible intrusions that current institutions, laws, and markets
enable.191 We must, therefore, be particularly imaginative—not
take existing intrusions as to what privacy is but rather keep
exploring what privacy might be, and how technology companies
might respond to the introduction of new institutional, legal or
technical, protections.
A Scanlonian approach to the means of data privacy
protection prompts us to ask three questions about consent and
its alternatives. First, whether, and to what extent, notice and
consent can constitute a reasonable protection against existing
and possible future interferences with our interests. Second, to
the extent notice and consent is insufficient to protect us against
harm, we must ask what alternatives it might be reasonable to
put in place to protect them. Third, when thinking about
implementing these alternatives, an important question is also
who should be in charge of determining, designing and deploying
these alternatives.
Regarding the first question, in the case of inalienable
rights the answer is intuitive: to the extent these interests are
inalienable, they cannot be given up through contractual
agreements or acts of consent. Instead, to protect them we must
put in place institutional protections that at least narrow the
scope of the intrusive practices in question and at best render
them unlawful and promote a reconfiguration of digital business
models. Transparency and disclosure cannot protect platform
users in this sense.
Potential answers to the second and third questions, above,
will be developed further in Part V of this Article.
c. The Residual
Management

Case

against

Privacy

Self-

We are left with the following two questions concerning
aspects of privacy or online harms that are neither collective nor
inalienable. First, if there are such aspects, what do they consist
of? Second, to what extent can we legitimately disclose or
consent to intrusions into these aspects of our private lives
191. See TRUTH AND POWER, supra note 154.
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without giving up our core inalienable interest in data privacy
and against manipulative intrusions?
Nothing said so far about inalienable rights amounts to
saying that privacy is inalienable in its entirety. Under
Nissenbaum, Scanlon’s or other accounts, we may still be
understood to have certain alienable interests in keeping certain
information about ourselves private only as long as we choose
not to disclose it. It seems legitimate to be able to alienate
information in various ways: I may have a disease and choose to
disclose the fact to my doctor, I may show a photo of my dress to
a group of friends, I may invite a colleague into my home for
lunch or tell them facts about my private life. If these
disclosures were to be done by way of consent, e.g. a doctor
asking about my disease, my friends asking if they can look at a
photo, or a colleague asking if she can come into my house, then
these would be instances where my consent would be performing
its morally transformative role. However, none of these cases
are cases of use or access to personal data in digital settings.
The digital environment has rendered the question of alienation
less straightforward.
When it comes to the Internet, there are good reasons to be
able to decide how to share personal content on Facebook or
Twitter, but we should distinguish between decisions about
online content and decisions about online data, including
metadata, geolocation and tracking data, inferred data, and
behavioral data. Choosing to share information with an
audience, on an online platform or elsewhere, does not mean
accepting to be subjected to surreptitious targeted
advertisement or inferences based on that information. While
the first is a choice, the second is the result of a business model
that undermines our ability to make informed choices.
Thomson relies on an example that can help clarify some
misunderstandings. Her example is as follows:
[I]f my husband and I are having a loud fight,
behind open windows, so that we can easily be
heard by the normal person who passes by, then if
a passerby stops to listen, he violates no right of
ours, and so in particular does not violate our
right to privacy. Why doesn’t he? I think it is
because, though he listens to us, we have let him
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listen (whether intentionally or not), we have
waived our right to not be listened to - for we took
none of the conventional and easily available
steps (such as closing the windows and lowering
our voices) to prevent listening.192
For Thomson, leaving the windows open amounts to waiving
a right which could be understood as a right to privacy. First,
let us suppose the windows had been opened intentionally to let
people listen. In that case, by inviting someone to cross a
conventional boundary, to listen to my private conversation, I
have waived the right to complain about the boundary crossing
itself. When I invite my neighbor to dinner at my house, I cannot
reasonably complain that my neighbor is inside my house having
dinner. When I post a video publicly on YouTube, I cannot
complain that people are looking at it. In these cases, I still have
reasonable grounds to complain, however, when my neighbor
picks up my tax returns on a table and reads them, or when
YouTube starts showing me adverts based on the video’s
contents. A voluntary and intentional invitation to cross a
privacy boundary can be understood as a waiver of the right to
complain about that specific voluntary disclosure but it does not
extinguish all claims to privacy within that sphere. There is in
other words no window the voluntary opening of which, nor any
box the voluntary ticking of which, extinguishes all of our
alienable and inalienable interests in data privacy or makes any
and all invasions of our data privacy interests reasonable.
As we have seen, the harm we need protection against is not
only a privacy harm but includes manipulative intrusions. A
mere failure to take conventional precautions against
intrusions, such as leaving a window open, cannot amount to a
waiver of a right to prevent intrusions in a dynamic and opaque
space such as the platform economy where we cannot know
which kinds of intrusions might exist let alone be harmful.
Platforms are not apartments, they are more like open plans
with invisible windows always open by default. Even though
windows can in some cases be closed with some effort by
individuals with acute vision or sophisticated tools, this may be
a world to complain about, our interest in being respected as
192. Thomson, supra note 122, at 306.

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol40/iss1/7

68

378

PACE LAW REVIEW

40.1

persons and in not being covertly used or instrumentalized for
others’ selfish motives arguably being interfered with on an
ongoing basis. Many people might never see windows being
open, some people may see them, yet have a hard time closing
them. All these people have reason to complain because they
can envisage an alternative world where windows are not
invisible or not always open by default. Yet in this hypothetical
world, those who control the construction of windows prefer the
world as it is, with default invisible open windows. These same
entities who control the construction of windows in turn see
notice and consent very favorably; it allows them to justify the
status quo without incurring any liability or harm. It acts as a
free pass on their otherwise illegitimate behavior.
We, therefore, should resist an expansive understanding of
our alienable interests in privacy in the platform economy for at
least five reasons. First, in this context there are very few
aspects which we choose to disclose about ourselves that have no
impact on others. Even willingly sharing certain kinds of
information on platforms has effects on the information
ecosystem of others, including how algorithms will make
predictions about people with similar tastes. Second, choices to
disclose information on platforms are not always clearly
autonomous and are often induced by the behavior of others, or
by psychological nudges that prompt us to keep logging in.
Third, alienable privacy aspects can have discriminatory effects
through data and algorithmic processing. Any information we
disclose can lead to asymmetric treatments or biases. Markets
over data, for instance, have the potential to lead to great
inequalities.
Fourth, sharing incentivizes sharing,
commodification leads to more commodification, and this leads
to long term alienation and harm.193 There is harm in letting
markets take advantage of individuals, even when what is being
commodified is alienable if considered in isolation. Fifth, behind
the shiny façade of content-sharing platforms lies a covert
market for the appropriation and exploitation of personal data,
and from the above discussion we have a right to inalienable
protections against abuses on the latter front.
These arguments against commodification and against
expansive understandings of alienable interests in data privacy
193. See KARL MARX, DAS KAPITAL (1867).
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lead us to our discussion of platform power in Part V of this
Article.
V. Consent as Disempowerment and Moving Beyond
It has been argued throughout this Article that consent
cannot have morally transformative force unless three things
are true: (a) consent must be largely free and autonomous and it
must be given under just background conditions; (b) consent
must be capable of transforming the rights, obligations, or states
of affairs that it is being relied on to transform; and (c) consent
must not have harmful effects on third parties. Parts III and IV
have demonstrated that (b) and (c) cannot be true in the platform
economy, because most, if not all, of the things consent is used
to legitimate or transform are not transformable through acts of
individualized consent. These things are either inalienable and
constitutive of what it means to be a person with dignity, or their
individualized and siloed transformation can have significant
negative effects on third parties. This section extends the
argument by showing that questions regarding inalienability (b)
and the collectivity (c) are intimately related to the question of
what it means for consent to be free, autonomous, and given
under just background conditions (a).
Specifically, to
understand why notice and consent practices cannot have
morally transformative force in the platform economy, we need
to understand the power dimensions that underlie these
practices.
This section offers further context on the debate on consent
by framing it normatively as a question of justice, articulating
why a capacious understanding of justice requires the inclusion
of power considerations. It then shows why our reasons for
valuing consent are weak, why arguments about paternalism
miss the mark, and ends with an evaluation of platform
governance options.
A. Beyond the Mirage of Transformation:
1. The Conditions for Voluntary Consent are Absent
Adding to the performative mirage of relying on consent to
morally justify the curtailment of certain inalienable interests
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and relationships, we must ask whether autonomous selfdirected and voluntary consent of the kind described in Part I of
this Article is an actual possibility in the digital ecosystem. Two
sets of arguments are generally advanced to show that voluntary
consent may itself be a mirage.
There are unbridgeable psychological barriers to full,
informed, unambiguous and voluntary consent.
These barriers are as diverse as they are numerous.
Structural complexity affects individuals’ ability to make good
decisions regarding their personal data.194 Daniel Solove shows
that individuals share data with hundreds of websites without
realizing it.195 Both data aggregation and the cumulative nature
of harms in this space adds to the complexity of making sound
choices; technology platforms process data continuously, they
aggregate and disaggregate the data, add new data to preexisting datasets, train models on old datasets and then let them
run on new data, etc. The results are unpredictable, such that
adding a small innocuous piece of information can have
deleterious and unforeseen effects on vulnerable people.196
Moreover, as said, there is evidence that people do not read the
terms and conditions, and if they read them, often they do not
understand them.197 Further, people are biased in their privacy
choices and easily affected by small changes in the choice and
consent architecture.198 We are inconsistent in that we say we
care about privacy but then sign-up for a Twitter profile and post
information publicly.199 Susan Athey, Christian Catalini, and
Catherine Tucker found that people with a concern about
privacy have no second thoughts providing their friends’ emails
in exchange for pizza, and also that providing individuals with
irrelevant but reassuring information about privacy protection
in fact nudges them toward less privacy-friendly choices.200 Cass
194. Solove & Hartzog, supra note 6, at 1888.
195. Id.
196. See, e.g., CATHY O’ NEIL, WEAPONS OF MATH DESTRUCTION (2016).
197. See, e.g., Ben-Shahar & Schneider, supra note 56.
198. See generally Alessandro Acquisti, Nudging Privacy: The Behavioral
Economics of Personal Information, SECURITY & PRIVACY ECONOMICS 82
(Nov./Dec. 2009); SUNSTEIN & THALER, infra note 201.
199. See Harry G. Frankfurt, Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a
Person, 68 J. OF PHIL. 5 (1971) (discussing the first and second order
preferences).
200. Susan Athey et al., supra note 125. See also Acquisti et al., supra
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Sunstein and Richard Thaler’s work on nudges also provides
interesting insights: for instance privacy defaults matter and
users will hardly change them.201 Familiarity with privacy
risks202 and the context of choice-making also affect the outcome
of our decisions about privacy.203 We also tend to be heavily
influenced by other people’s privacy choices,204 and stick to bad
privacy choices made in the past.205 A small increase in the costs
of one alternative can lead people to switch their attitude to
privacy quite radically.206
There are legal and strategic barriers to full, informed,
unambiguous and voluntary consent.
In addition to the psychological barriers to informed
consent, legal, and strategic constraints make full transparency
or meaningful disclosure are impossible. There is tension
between fair disclosure on the one hand, and marketing
techniques as well as trade secrets practices on the other.207
Companies use legal terms and conditions with their users as
shields to protect themselves from liability and as swords to
continue to carry out objectionable practices. Companies whose
business models rely heavily on data collection and analytics
have an incentive to use vague, unspecific, and non-threatening
language in their terms of service. This is unsurprising in light
of the losses they would suffer if their users decided not to opt
into these services because of their contractual terms. Further,
sophisticated processing techniques such as machine learning
algorithms and the use of neural networks often evade
explainability208 and companies assert overbroad trade secrecy
claims over these activities.
2. Consent is about Power
note 57.
201. CASS SUNSTEIN & RICHARD THALER, NUDGE 34 (2008).
202. Id. at 24.
203. Id. at 36.
204. Acquisti et. al., supra note 57, at 511.
205. DAN ARIELY, PREDICTABLY IRRATIONAL 240 (2008).
206. Acquisti et. al., supra note 57, at 510.
207. Julie E. Cohen, Turning Privacy Inside Out, 20 THEORETICAL
INQUIRIES L. 1 (2019).
208. See, e.g., David Weinberger, Optimization over Explanation Maximizing the benefits of machine learning without sacrificing its intelligence,
MEDIUM (January 28, 2018), https://perma.cc/L92A-6QXZ.
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While these barriers are important, it is reductive to see
them as exhaustive justifications for resisting consent. As
discussed in Part I of this Article, we must ensure not only that
the subjective conditions for informed consent are fulfilled, but
also that the background conditions within which consent
operates are just. For example, Bill might have consented to
giving his snack to John, but if John grabs the snack in the
context of an ongoing abusive relationship, or if it normalizes
abuse, then his act remains unjustified and consent has no
transformative value. Focusing on skillfully drawn lists of
conditions for voluntary consent and disclosure, suggests that by
considering voluntariness and ensuring that disclosure is
accurate, we can pass judgment on the appropriateness of notice
and consent in the digital context.
This approach is reductive. Confining our reasons in this
way fails to take into account the power dynamics that underlie
the practice of consent. The problem is not only that individuals
have no valid alternatives, or are unable to choose, or lack
voluntariness or understanding, but that consent is being
weaponized by powerful industry actors to forward their agenda.
They do this by exaggerating the liberating force of consent for
individuals, by idealizing its morally transformative value, and
always resisting governmental interferences and downplaying
alternative regulatory protections that would be largely more
effective for users. It is only by situating the practice within this
corporate strategy devised to avoid governments and exploit
individuals that the actual value of consent can be uncovered.
The approaches of the FTC and EU data protection authorities
leave us perplexed because they are based on precisely this
narrow checklist approach: focused on voluntariness and
idealized consent. In doing so, these authorities gloss over
deeper justice concerns and fail to account for the detrimental
effects on those left behind.
B. Platform Power
Corporate manipulation of users cannot be addressed
through a checklist or by focusing on implausible forms of
voluntariness, disclosure, and informed consent. Our insatiable
desire for platform harms and our gluttonous appetite for
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manipulation seem to call for an explanation that moves past
traditional checklist understandings of autonomy and coercion.
Underlying the psychological, factual, strategic, and legal
impossibilities described above is the question of how power is
exercised in digital ecosystems. Therefore, instead of playing
with the conditions for disclosure and informed consent,
regulators should start focusing on how data is collected,
handled, and stored. Additionally, they should focus on how it
is being systematically analyzed through machine learning and
other proprietary algorithmic systems to make inferences about
individuals, pre-empt their tastes, and influence their decisions
in view of making a profit.
What is power in this context? There are three views of
platforms’ power. The traditional view is illustrated by the
understanding of market power in traditional antitrust law.
Antitrust law defines market power as “the ability of one or more
firms to profitably increase prices, reduce output, choice or
quality of goods and services, diminish innovation, or otherwise
influence parameters of competition”209 or the ability “to raise
price, reduce output, diminish innovation, or otherwise harm
customers as a result of diminished competitive constraints or
incentives.”210 The traditional view is relational and is premised
on direct causation: there must be an entity exercising power
and it must exercise its power by using force, coercing or
otherwise directly imposing harm on others. The harms must
be tangible and observable, and include price increases or
narrowly understood observable quality erosions.
These
parameters have largely missed the intangible erosion of
fundamental rights standards in the platform economy.211
Recent events, such as the Cambridge Analytica scandal,
have led to a broadening of regulators’ interest in platform
209. Guidelines on the assessment of horizontal mergers under the
Council Regulation on the control of concentrations between undertakings
para. 8 (EC), 2004 O.J. (C 31/5) [hereinafter “Horizontal Merger Guidelines”].
210. Dep’t of Justice & Fed. Trade Comm’n, Horizontal Merger Guidelines
(Aug. 19, 2010), https://perma.cc/P2GY-3NSA. Yet note that there are plans to
amend such Guidelines. See Charles McConnell, US FTC considers updating
Horizontal Merger Guidelines, Global Competition Review (Sept. 19, 2019),
https://perma.cc/XLU2-PPSR.
211. See Orla Lynskey, Regulating ‘Platform Power’, 16 London Sch.
Econ., Law, Society and Economy Working Papers 1/2017 (2017),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2921021.
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power. A new conception of platform power seems to have
emerged as a result.
An example is the German
Bundeskartellamt’s decision against Facebook.212
The
authority’s belief that antitrust and privacy laws can work in
tandem to hold powerful companies with vast pools of data in
check is grounded in an idea of power as ownership and control
over vast amounts of personal data. The ability of a company to
control vast amounts of data is indeed being increasingly
perceived as harmful for both users and competitors who are
unable to compete on the market for that data.
The
Bundeskartellamt’s understanding defeats the traditional logic
of market power, and places the power asymmetry between
users and platforms at the forefront of regulators’ attention.
Such view, however, is still premised on the need to re-establish
users and competitors’ control over data, and on the paramount
value of control and user choice.
The third more radical view does not see platform power as
a tangible force that is exercised linearly by one party over
another to deprive the latter of control or choice over how data
is being collected or used. It is a broader vision of power as a
systemic force structurally embedded in the platform economy.
This cannot be fixed through small regulatory tweaks or better
disclosure, but requires a radical revision of the way platforms
operate and sustain themselves economically.
This vision has been developed by Shoshana Zuboff through
her work on “surveillance capitalism” as an evil that has grown
systemically through banal business routine. She defines
“surveillance capitalism’s” effects as ones that “cannot be
reduced to or explained by technology or the bad intentions of bad
people, [but that] are the consistent and predictable consequences
of an internally consistent and successful logic of
accumulation.”213 Julie Cohen is also critical of systemic
domination.214 Cohen envisions platforms as “infrastructurebased strategies for introducing friction into networks”215 which
operate “with the goal of making clusters of transactions and
relationships stickier—sticky enough to adhere to the platform
212.
213.
(2019).
214.
215.

BKA, Prohibition Decision supra note 106.
SHOSHANA ZUBOFF, THE AGE OF SURVEILLANCE CAPITALISM 192
COHEN, TRUTH AND POWER, supra note 154.
Id. at 40.
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despite participants’ theoretical ability to exit and look elsewhere
for other intermediation options.”216 For her: “[t]he platform
economy rewrites all parts of [the competition] story reshaping
the conditions of entry, the scope for disruption, and the sources
of manifestation of economic power. Platforms do not simply
enter markets, they replace (and rematerialize) them.”217
This third view of platform power understands platforms as
loci of domination and control which benefit from and leverage
the centralizing effects of the networks they exist within, are
coextensive with and participate in creating. It goes beyond the
Bundeskartellamt understanding of power, beyond a view
according to which one party exerts power by selecting the
options or choices available to another. As Stephen Lukes
compellingly articulates it, power is about shaping the very
environment within which a chooser’s preferences are formed.218
For Lukes, the core characteristic of a power relation is not an
observable exercise of influence or an observable reduction in the
number of options available but rather the existence of a
systematic interference with what those being dominated need
or have reason to want. As he notes, numbing is the primary
manifestation of grave forms of power:
[I]s it not the supreme and most insidious exercise
of power to prevent people, to whatever degree,
from having grievances by shaping their
perceptions, cognitions and preferences in such a
way that they accept their role in the existing
order of things, either because they can see it as
natural and unchangeable, or because they value
it as divinely ordained and beneficial?219
It seems relevant to an understanding of platform power,
therefore, that the things we have reason to want to protect,
such as privacy or access to information without manipulation
or discrimination, are not being afforded to us through consent,
and in fact that practices of notice and consent render protecting

216.
217.
218.
219.
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these things more difficult. A Foucaultian understanding of
power220 can be particularly useful in explaining this
discrepancy; how the rhetoric of consent operates against our
interests, its particular internal logic and rhetorical force
prevents enquiry into its disempowering effects.221 In other
words, notice and consent normalizes platform power, operating
as a discourse of control which subtly burdens users with
intractable governance responsibilities without empowering
them. It acts as a free pass for corporate action.
C. The Value of Notice and Consent within a Theory of
Platform Justice
Scanlon points out that it is generally “a good thing for a
person to have what will happen depend upon how he or she
responds when presented with the alternatives under the right
conditions.”222 There are good reasons to be able to self-manage
privacy: it gives one a sense of responsibility, security, control
over aspects of the self. Before concluding we must consider the
value of notice and consent once again and determine whether a
comprehensive perspective makes us prefer consent to other
alternatives.223
Thomas Scanlon’s account of what he calls the “Value of
Choice” offers some guidance on this question.224 Choice can
have predictive or instrumental value (e.g. choosing my own
meal because I know what I will enjoy eating); representative or
demonstrative value (e.g. it is important that I be the one
choosing my present for my mother’s birthday, even if I often buy
things she dislikes); or symbolic value where there is stigma

220. Michel Foucault, POWER/KNOWLEDGE: SELECTED INTERVIEWS AND
OTHER WRITINGS 1972-1977, (ed. Craig Gordon, 1980).
221. FOUCAULT, THE ARCHAEOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE AND THE DISCOURSE ON
LANGUAGE, supra note 15.
222. Thomas M. Scanlon, The Tanner Lectures on Human Values at
Brasenose College, Oxford University: The Significance of Choice 177, 178
(May 18, 23, and 28, 1986) (transcript available from the University of Utah,
Tanner Humanities Center, Lecture Library). See also a revised account in
SCANLON, supra note 186.
223. SCANLON, supra note 186.
224. Thomas M. Scanlon, The Significance of Choice: Tanner Lectures,
Lecture 2, at 177-201 (1986). Also see a revised account in WHAT WE OWE TO
EACH OTHER ch. 6 (1998).
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attached to my not making certain decisions myself which might
make me look incompetent, immature, etc.. (e.g. in some cultures
it is important that I should be the one choosing my life partner
and not my parents). These three categories of reasons for
valuing choice are not mutually exclusive. By way of analogy,
there are instrumental and intrinsic reasons for valuing consent
as a regulatory device in the platform economy and we cannot
entirely separate intrinsic from instrumental reasons.
Instrumental justifications focus on the benefits that consent
can bring to individual consenters.225 The most common
instrumental justification for consent is that the individual has
the best information to judge whether new rights should be
created.226 Non-instrumental or intrinsic justifications focus on
consent as having value regardless of consequences. These
reasons are generally grounded in an understanding of consent
as allowing individuals to create their own moral law, pursue
projects, and choose their own paths to flourishing. Let us
examine possible reasons for maintaining the centrality of
consent in the platform economy.
The first argument is that notice and consent are said to
promote innovation and simplicity; it is seamless, versatile and
is said to efficiently promote smooth business transitions
avoiding excessive regulatory interference while ensuring their
legitimacy.227 Individuals are said to have the most knowledge
on what they want and consent allows them to easily make
choices. This argument advances a narrow understanding of
innovation and an idealized view on the ability of individuals to
police their own interests. As discussed, the amount of
knowledge individuals possess in such situations is subject to
debate and is far from complete. Further, deregulation and selfregulation happen to favor incumbents more than they favor
new entrants or consumers.228 This has become clear in the
context of antitrust enforcement where the Chicago school belief
in deregulation and permissionless innovation229 is being
225. See, e.g., THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN (1651); JOHN LOCKE, SECOND
TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT (1690).
226. RAZ, supra note 21, at 85.
227. See, e.g., Erika J. Nash, Notice and Consent: A Healthy Balance
Between Privacy and Innovation for Wearables, 33 BYU J. PUB. L. 197 (2018).
228. Yochai Benkler, Don’t Let industry write the Rules for AI, 569
NATURE 161 (2019).
229. Richard A. Posner, The Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis, 127 U.
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reconsidered and top down antitrust enforcement in digital
matters is reacquiring popularity.230 The FTC’s new Facebook
decision, discussed above, is another demonstration of the
current regulatory trend.231 Further, the ideology of innovation
is far from flawless.232
The second argument is that notice and consent advances
users’ data security. Competition over security avoids the
erosion of standards which might result from a state monopoly
over technology. It also limits governmental interferences into
users’ lives by allowing private companies to handle data. This
argument ignores that consent incentivizes the creation and
storage of data, and that the more data is generated, the higher
the security risks.
Thus, insofar as notice and consent
contributes to data generation, it increases instead of reducing
risks for individuals.233 Further, we know that the data stored
by the industry is not immune from governmental access.234
The third argument is that notice and consent allow
individuals to obtain access to desired services at no cost. The
reality here is that consent does not allow individuals to obtain
such services at no cost. Instead, consent subjects their access
to a variety of covert, manipulative, and discriminatory
treatments that do not serve their interests in the long run.
Consent serves the interests of the platform owners and other
data brokers and third-party data collectors but not the interests
of users who are disempowered in the platform economy. Thus,
none of these three good reasons for relying on consent seem
PA. L. REV. 925 (1978); ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT
WAR WITH ITSELF (1978).
230. See, e.g., Lina Khan, Amazon’s Antitrust Paradox, 126 YALE L. J. 710
(2017); Maurice Stucke, Reconsidering Antitrust’s Goals, 53 B.C. L. REV. 551,
611 (2012); Maurice Stucke, Should We Be Concerned About Data-opolies? 2
GEO. L. TECH. REV. 275, 280 (2018); TIM WU, THE CURSE OF BIGNESS: ANTITRUST
IN THE NEW GILDED AGE (2018).
231. USA v. Facebook, Inc. , No. 91-cv-2184, 2019 WL 3318596 (D.D.C.,
July 24, 2019).
232. See, e.g., Langdon Winner, The Cult of Innovation: Its Colorful Myths
and Rituals, BLOG (June 12, 2017), https://perma.cc/M8MN-8Y6L.
233. See, e.g., BRUCE SCHNEIER, DATA AND GOLIATH (2015).
234. Google reports in its Transparency Report that between January 1
and June 30 2018 it received more than 25.5 thousand government requests
for individual users’ information. See Transparency Report: Government
Requests
to
Remove
Content,
Google
https://transparencyreport.google.com/government-removals/overview?hl=en
(last visited Nov. 22, 2019).
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sufficient.
Looking now at the alternatives, while consent might have
unique intrinsic value in that it ensures that individuals are at
least symbolically informed of how they will be treated by
platforms, it seems that replacing notice and consent with most
alternatives would come at very little cost for individuals. For
example, relying on representatives, cooperatives, or trustees
could ensure access to desirable services on more acceptable
terms thanks to the greater bargaining power of such
representatives, trustees, or cooperatives vis-à-vis platforms.235
Ensuring minimized collection and analytics, secure handling
and storage of our data may be impossible for us to consent to
directly due to trade secrecy, IP, and other proprietary
arrangements. However, secure handling and storage may be
possible through an intermediary, even if they acted outside the
scope of our consent.236 To the extent there is value in
intermediation, it seems that the value of individualized consent
is very limited.
Another alternative is the establishment of industry-wide
privacy-protective interoperable standards which would
promote the privacy interests of users even if they would not
provide them with granular opportunities to make contextual
choices. It also seems that granular and versatile opportunities
to make choices can lead to more harm than good in an
environment where our choices are highly sensitive to small
design changes and nudging.
Overall, it seems that intrinsic and instrumental reasons for
valuing consent go hand-in-hand. To the extent consent does not
allow individuals to determine desirable outcomes for
themselves, i.e. to the extent it has no instrumental value, it
seems to also have no intrinsic value in the sense of affording to
individuals respect or worth, other than perhaps mere symbolic
or ideological value.

235. See, e.g., Katrina Ligett & Kobbi Nissim, Ground Rules and Goals for
Data Co-ops
(2019) (unpublished manuscript); RADICALXCHANGE,
https://radicalxchange.org (last visited Nov. 22, 2019) (showing the work
currently carried out by Radicalxchange).
236. See COHEN, TRUTH AND POWER, supra note 154.
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D. Clearing Doubts about Paternalism
Regarding consent’s intrinsic value, it has been argued that
it remains important for individuals to be directly notified or
informed of what a platform intends to do with their data.
Daniel Susser for example argues that notice maintains its value
in spite of the flaws of notice and consent.237 It might also be
argued that it remains important that any intermediary, data
cooperative, or trustee is directly entrusted by a data subject
with a mandate to act on their behalf. Even if notice and
disclosure remain incomplete, the symbolic or representative
value attached to the notification and disclosure process might
remain intact. The strength of this argument is that it might
point us toward regulatory solutions that combine notice and
consent with greater top down protections for individuals, but it
does not suggest that the legal and regulatory status quo in the
US or EU is satisfactory.
It is no doubt important to recognize the value of having the
choice, of freely associating with others and of leading a life of
one’s own choosing. In this sense, accepting that consent’s
symbolic or representative value may give us reason to consider
governance options that entail complementing the practice with
additional safeguards is important. On the other hand, arguing
that any and all interferences with choice are illegitimate and
must pejoratively be understood as paternalistic is the wrong
way of valuing choice.
To the extent a governance option is advanced on the ground
that it avoids “paternalistic” interferences with individual
choice, we should be inclined to resist such justifications.
Scanlon offers a nuanced explanation of why this is:
Legal restriction of people’s freedom, “for their
own good” is likely to seem justified where (a)
people who make a certain choice are likely to
suffer very serious loss; (b) the instrumental value
of choice as a way of warding off this loss is, given
the circumstances under which that choice would

237. Daniel Susser, Notice After Notice-and-Consent: Why Privacy
Disclosures Are Valuable Even If Consent Frameworks Aren’t, 9 J. INFO. POL.
(2019).
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be exercised, seriously undermined; (c) the
demonstrative value that would be lost by being
deprived of this choice is minimal; and (d) the
tendency to “make the wrong choice” under the
circumstances in question is widely shared, so
that no particular group is being held inferior in
the argument for legal regulation. The pejorative
ring of “paternalism” and the particular bitterness
attaching to it stem from cases in which either the
seriousness of the loss in question or the
foolishness of the choice leading to it is a matter
of controversy.238
Standard privacy terms of service are systematically
skewed in favor of technology platforms that intentionally craft
them to minimize disclosures and limit responsibility. There is
a large and shared tendency to make the wrong choice, sign up
to phishy websites and share data with unknown third parties
by clicking “I agree,” or simply accepting to browse the Internet
and be tracked. Individuals who make those choices risk
suffering serious loss. The instrumental value of consent as a
way of limiting damage for individuals is limited at best. We
have also seen that the case for the intrinsic value of consent is
weak, and that alternatives such as delegation of consent to
cooperatives or trusts are acceptable if not preferable to notice
and consent.239
The purpose of this Article was not to advance alternatives
to notice and consent, or explain how alternative decisionmakers might be better placed than individuals to make
decisions on data governance. The aim was simply to show that
there are good reasons to depart from the centrality of
individualized notice and consent in practice and in theory. Any
political or regulatory authority, or group of individuals, charged
with regulating personal data and shaping the relationship
between platforms and individuals is likely to make mistakes.
Yet, recognizing that alternative decision-makers are likely to
make mistakes is different from saying that any decisions that

238. Scanlon, supra note 222, at 181.
239. See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin, Information Fiduciaries and the First
Amendment, 49 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1183 (2016).
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are not individually made are for that reason “paternalistic.”
Given the limitations of notice and consent as a practice,
considering the role of these alternative decision-makers has
become a priority. For the time being, it suffices to say that
democratically determined standards and redlines regarding the
generation, collection, storage and use of data need our focus
more than notice and consent schemes do.
E. How to Regulate Platforms
Moving from consent to a broader perspective on how to
regulate online platforms, the first question is what is regulation
and how do we address the gaps that notice and consent
practices have created and are leaving behind? A few points
should be noted. First, the regulative power of law is to be found
not only in public or regulatory laws, but also within less visible
regimes such as private property and contractual
arrangements.240 Second, it is important to keep in mind that
what we traditionally understand as laws are not the only force
at play; technologies, or socio-technical artifacts, can constrain
behavior even more than laws do. Laws in turn can act as
technologies, entrenching technical defaults and reinforcing
ideological interpretations of environmental constraints and
affordances.241 In 1998 Lawrence Lessig in his famous essay The
Laws of Cyberspace dwelled on the idea,242 that on the Internet,
code shapes human behavior as much as laws, social norms and
economic forces.243 Regulators for Lessig have four “modalities”
at their disposal— laws, norms, markets and code—and when it
comes to the Internet, perhaps the most powerful modality is the
use of code. Thus, legal and technological frameworks together
shape our understanding of what platforms are and of the
contexts in which notice and consent frameworks operate. Legal
frameworks have transformed notice and consent into an
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artifact that shapes digital expectations and generates
resistance around cultural, legal, technological and commercial
alternatives.244
We are currently at a crossroads. A number of competing
regulatory, technological, social, and economic models are being
put forward to address the question of how to govern data and
how to hold platform monopolies in check. In the United States,
nationalization of technology platforms is unpopular,245 but
breaking up big tech and antitrust is not,246 nor is regulating
platforms as public utilities.247 Internationalizing regulatory
standards is becoming a priority.248 Technological solutionism
is on the rise with initiatives such as blockchain-based data
monetization platforms or new modes of web interaction.249
Economists are reinventing markets for data to markets for the
provision of labor by individuals to platforms.250 Scholars have
proposed a variety of solutions to the data and platform
regulation puzzle. To name a few, Jack Balkin suggested
treating platforms as information fiduciaries.251
Margot
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Kaminsky envisions a “binary governance” framework which
combines a system of individual due process rights with privatepublic partnerships which she calls “collaborative governance,”
the GDPR being an instance of such model.252 Julie Cohen has
emphasized the importance of spaces immune from the control
of platforms, what she calls “semantic discontinuity” and
“interstitial spaces for play,”253 and Shoshana Zuboff speaks of a
“right to sanctuary.”254
In the context of this laboratory, moving beyond notice and
consent requires proceeding in at least three stages.
First, it is important to consider at the outset the history
and context of the harms that need tackling and the interests
which need to be protected. To do so, it is crucial to understand
the history, anthropology and sociology of how we have come to
where we are now, and why the notion of consent can appear
normatively compelling and rhetorically powerful yet practically
flawed in the context of consumer contracts and voluntary
privacy policies.255 This Article described some of the harms in
question as invasions of privacy, manipulation, discrimination,
bias, lack of due process, political polarization and echo chamber
effects. We not only need a better understanding of these harms,
but we also need richer analyses of how they connect to the
broader, abstract, systemically-skewed platform ecosystem and
the power dynamics that underlie it. Save in exceptional
circumstances, we must be skeptical about “solutions” that
present themselves as “fixes,” yet denote utter disregard for the
historical, sociological, psychological and ideological dimensions
of power which has led to the problem itself. These “solutions”
frequently do little more than recreate the same problems they
were designed to address.
Second, we must remain critical toward answers to the
platform governance problem that tend to put most or all the
responsibility for protection from harm on individuals, and/or
confer broad discretion, immunity and moral cover on deep
252. Margot Kaminsky, Binary Governance: Lessons from the GDPR’s
Approach to Algorithmic Accountability, 92 S. CAL. L. REV. 1529 (forthcoming
2019).
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pocketed and technically savvy companies for the sake of
protecting innovation. These suggestions are particularly
problematic when they rely on the disclosure of complex
information and connect broad responsibilities and
consequences to implausible disclosures. Notice and consent is
one such problematic solution. Other problematic solutions
which must be resisted include: individualized data auctions,
blockchain-based apps or other means to easily transfer data
and monetize it which abstract individual choice from larger
social dynamics.
Third and finally, when asking how to address data
governance and the relationship between users and platforms,
we must prefer comprehensive regulation that tackles structural
harm.
For instance, focusing on the notion of “data
minimization” under the GDPR to narrow “fixes” that address
legal questions in isolation.
The following is a list of strategies or developments that are
welcome and in some cases should be further developed:
 The GDPR is an example of sectoral regulation which,
although it focuses in our view too heavily on informed
consent and privacy self-management, in fact contains a
number of important shifts toward privacy protective
defaults, and innovative provisions.
Such privacy
protection measures include: data protection by design,256
data protection impact assessments,257 and data
minimization principles,258 all of which require
coordination between data controllers and privacy
regulators, thus departing from individual control.
 The recent FTC Facebook investigation and five billion
dollar fine, in spite of criticisms that the FTC did not go
far enough, is a signal for the industry that privacy and
behavioral advertising are no joking matter. It also
provided an opportunity for FTC commissioners to
demand greater enforcement powers, and to signal the
need for federal privacy legislation.259 In parallel, there

256.
257.
258.
259.

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol40/iss1/7

Id. at art. 25.
Gen. Data Protection Reg., supra note 8, at art. 35.
Id. at art. 5.
See Simons et al., supra note 82, at 6.

86

396

PACE LAW REVIEW

40.1

are signs that antitrust enforcement against technology
companies is on the rise in the United States.260
 The Bundeskartellamt decision against Facebook,261 in
spite of its focus on informed consent, is also a welcome
attempt at regulating technology platforms by reaching
beyond disciplinary silos, and opting for a cross-sectoral
and cross-disciplinary methodology that puts forward a
new understanding of platform power. Further calls
have been made recently for a unified approach to
platform governance or the regulation of social media
through a one-stop-shop. Each of these initiatives
deserves individualized scrutiny.
 There have been calls for data fiduciaries, data trusts or
intermediaries of various kinds that would act as buffers
between users and platforms. While not all of these
proposals are equally sound, recent work around data
cooperatives seems to be heading in a promising
direction.262
 Finally, if notice and consent is here to stay, which is a
possibility, it is crucial that it be complemented with
stringent standards of privacy compliance on the part of
technology actors and that it does not remain a
standalone means of governing privacy. The California
Consumer Privacy Act is a very timid move toward
greater empowerment of users vis-à-vis companies,
which entrenches notice and consent and does not appear
to go far enough. A number of Federal Proposals are also
similarly removing the voluntary element in notice and
choice practices in the United States. The American Law
Institute’s Restatement on Consumer Contracts have
attempted to establish protections for consumers who
opt-in to browserwrap contracts because of behavioral
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biases and information asymmetries in this space.263
More protections will be needed in future for addressing
the power gaps between users and platforms, but
arguably none of these protections can tackle the serious
underlying problems explored in this Article.
VI. Conclusion
Loose reliance on the binary presence or absence of
voluntary consent and disclosure has allowed online platforms
such as YouTube, Facebook, and Twitter to engage unhindered
in opaque and intrusive targeted advertising practices, profiling,
and other profit-making activities that have not clearly
benefited consumers and that actually covertly harm them.
Consent enables the moral transformation of the
relationship between persons in a variety of circumstances, but
access to information platforms does not seem one of them. As
said, justifying the morally transformative force of consent in
any context requires at least three elements. First, consent
cannot be used to transform rights and interests that are
inalienable. Second, consent must not have far-reaching effects
on third parties. Third, consent must not only be voluntary and
a self-directed act of the will, but it must also be given under just
background conditions, meaning that we need to consider the
underlying power dynamics that affect whether a person’s
reasons for consenting are justifiable.
In the platform economy, all three elements are missing.
Regulators and legal authorities focus on the voluntariness of
consent and the adequacy of companies’ disclosure idealizes the
practice in circumstances where it cannot have morally
transformative effects. Notice and consent frameworks place the
burden of data governance on individuals who are not in a
position to make individualized decisions about how data is
treated. They not only impose harms on people who never
consented to the practices themselves, but also subordinate our
core inalienable right to be protected against manipulative,
discriminatory and harmful digital practices, and to the
economic interests of the platforms. The idealization of such
263. RESTATEMENT OF CONSUMER CONTRACTS (Am. Law Inst., Tentative
Draft 2019), https://perma.cc/9QNR-ZJGR.
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practice has also had the effect of reducing the interest and
appetite of administrative agencies, legislators, civil society and
consumers for more adequate alternatives.
There are, therefore, many reasons to object to the
centrality of notice and consent mechanisms in the United
States and Europe. The time is now ripe to look beyond existing
paradigms of individual control and to grapple with the core
structure of corporate surveillance markets and incentives.
Emerging legislative proposals at the federal level in the United
States are hints that the winds might be changing, but more
needs to be done not only legally but also ideologically, socially,
and economically. A number of technological, political, and legal
avenues for enacting change and ensuring better protection for
consumers exist and deserve further attention. The longer we
fail to acknowledge consent’s irrelevance to data governance in
the platform economy, the longer we will deny ourselves respect
and protection from the ever-growing expansion of digital
markets into our lives.
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